Category Archives: Brazil

The Role the US Played in Reversing Latin America’s ‘Pink Tide’

9/12/07 Salon Blanco: Banco del Sur.A mere ten years ago almost all countries in South and Central America had left or center-left governments in office. Now only a handful remain. How did this happen? The Real News Network speaks to CEPR’s Mark Weisbrot about how Under Secretary of State Thomas Shannon might have described to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo the US effort to do help bring this change about

Story Transcript

SHARMINI PERIES: It’s The Real News Network, I’m Sharmini Peries coming to you from Baltimore. Less than ten years ago, Central and South America’s pink tide was at its highest point. Most of the continent had leftists or center-left governments in power. However, since 2009, more or less, when Honduras’s president Manuel Zelaya was ousted in a right-wing coup, the tide turned. And now, a conservative or center-right tide is firmly in place in the region except for the recent development of López-Obrador in Mexico. How did this undoing off the left tide happen? Of course, opponents of the pink tide say that these governments were elected or forced out of office because of their own policy failures. Another interpretation of all of this is that U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America under President George W. Bush and under President Barack Obama played a key role in reversing tide.

Now, this argument can be found in a letter from Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Thomas Shannon, who managed Latin America policy desk for both presidents. In truth, it is actually a fictional letter about the advice of Shannon, what he might have given Secretary of State Mike Pompeo when he resigned last month. This hypothetical letter was actually written by Mark Weisbrot, our next guest. Mark Weisbrot joins us now from Washington, D.C. to discuss U.S. Latin America policy managed under Latin American pink tide. Mark is the codirector of the Center for Economic Policy and Research and is the author of the book, Failed: What Experts Got Wrong About the Global Economy. Thanks for joining me, Mark.

MARK WEISBROT: Thanks for having me here, Sharmini.

SHARMINI PERIES: All right, Mark. Let’s start off with why you felt you had to pen this letter in order to draw attention to the undoing of the pink tide in Latin America.

MARK WEISBROT: Well, I thought it would be more interesting and readable. Most people are not that interested in the recent history of Latin America. And also, I want to emphasize that everything in there is true except for the fact that he didn’t actually write the letter. But everything he says in there, the facts are all sourced and they’re all public information. And even where it refers to positions that he took within the State Department, those are positions that were documented in the media.

SHARMINI PERIES: All right, Mark. In 2008, almost all of the South and Central American states had prgressive or center left governments in place. And this includes El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile and Brazil. Now only Bolivia, El Salvador and Venezuela and Nicaragua remain, with the last two of these, one could say Nicaragua and Venezuela, in a great deal of trouble and in crisis. So, give us a sense of what happened.

MARK WEISBROT: Well, some of it was due to the recessions that these countries experienced. So, for example in Brazil, they went into recession in 2014 and that’s when the opposition began to gain ground and eventually impeach Dilma, the president, Dilma Rousseff, who they impeached without ever actually accusing her of of a crime. And so, in all of these, countries there were various factors at play. But what I emphasize in this letter in the form of Thomas Shannon taking credit for it, is that the U.S. played a role in in most of these countries where there was a change of government.

Some of it is not well known. Obviously, some of it is. In the 2009 coup in Honduras, Hillary Clinton wrote in her memoirs that she helped ensure that the democratically elected president of Honduras did not come back to office after the coup. But in others, people don’t even know. So, for example, in Argentina the U.S. government under Obama opposed loans to the government and blocked some at the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank. And this was a time when Argentina was having a balance of payments problem. So, that was important. And they did run into some economic trouble. It wasn’t severe, but I think it contributed to a close election result where the right was able to win at the end of 2015.

And also, I should say that in that in the case of Argentina they were severely hurt by a decision of a New York judge to take ninety percent of their creditors hostage and say that the government could not pay them until they paid the vulture funds. And that was very much a political decision. In fact, the judge lifted his injunction as soon as the right-wing President Macri was elected, and said it was because there was a new government that he was lifting the injunction. So, that was a major thing from the United States as well. And you can go through all of the countries. And some of it I’ve already said here on The Real News. There was a U.S. role, and of course we only see the tip of the iceberg.

Lula was interviewed a few months ago and he said, “It took us fifty years before we found out about the U.S. role in the 1964 coup.” And so, he was saying that to answer a question about what the United States was doing in Brazil. But you can see things that they did there as well. In fact, Shannon himself, Thomas Shannon met with the leader of the coup effort, the parliamentary coup in Brazil in 2016, when the leader in the Senate in Brazil of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Aloysio Nunes, came to the U.S. just a day after the vote to impeach Dilma took place in the House and met with Shannon. So, that was a signal to everyone in Brazil that the U.S. was behind this coup.

SHARMINI PERIES: All right, Mark. Now you argue that of course this kind of U.S. policy had a role to play in so many countries. Now, give us some examples, for example, Haiti and Honduras and Brazil, just remind people what the U.S. policy actually did in these countries.

MARK WEISBROT: Well, Haiti is a good example because they kind of did that in broad daylight. They took the president, the elected President, in 2004, flew them out of the country on one of those rendition planes, basically kidnapped him. And they didn’t even care. That was under George W. Bush, but the effort actually began under Clinton in 2000. There was an election there and the Organization of American States observers went there and they produced a report saying that everything was good. And then they changed that and they basically had a technical objection to some of the Senate elections. And they use that, and then the U.S. government under their first Clinton, then Bush, used that as a pretext to cut off almost all international aid to Haiti which was desperately poor.

And then, they by 2004, after four years of destabilization, they were funding opposition groups and they were also telling the President, Aristide, that he wouldn’t get aid restored until he reached an agreement with the opposition. And then at the same time, they were telling the opposition, don’t reach an agreement, don’t make any agreement with him because we’re going to get rid of him. And that’s how they did it. And they overthrew the government. And that was the second time they had overthrown the Haitian government since 1991. And so, that was just one example. Obviously, there was also the Honduran coup-.

SHARMINI PERIES: Before you go there, in Haiti’s case, they had the aid of a few other nations as well, France and Canada.

MARK WEISBROT: That’s right. And they got almost all the countries in the world to cut off their aid to Haiti between 2000 and 2004. And then, in 2011, there was an election in 2010, and in 2011, United States actually use the Organization of American States to overturn the results of the first round of the presidential election. And in that case, they also threatened Haiti to accept the results or they would cut off the post-earthquake aid, which was even more desperately needed. And so, they got to choose who made it into the second round and who became president there as well. And this really devastated Haiti in so many ways. I mean, you only had like a twenty percent turnout in the last presidential election in Haiti because the people have become so disenfranchised as a result primarily of U.S. intervention.

SHARMINI PERIES: Now one could argue having a poor country like Haiti, who was was so dependent on the U.S, the U.S. Can us can flex their muscles and make sure what they want takes place in Haiti. But what about a country like Brazil?

MARK WEISBROT: Well, I think they did. Like I said, I think that signal was important. The show of support for that coup I think helped. There was another show of support when John Kerry went down to Brazil on August 5 of the same year and he held a joint press conference with the acting Foreign Minister, Jose Serra and they said talked about how great their relationship was going to be going forward. And Dilma wasn’t even removed from office yet, she was still- the Senate hadn’t voted yet to remove her from office. So, that was another signal of support. Again, we don’t know what else they did.

Actually, we do know some other things. The Department of Justice was involved in the investigation, the big corruption investigation there. And so, we don’t know what they did, how it is that they managed to get Lula put in jail while the banks, who most of laundered the billions of dollars of corruption, there were no banks or financial institutions implicated in this whole investigation. So, that’s very odd. And of course, most Brazilians think that the Department of Justice intervention in the investigation was probably political and they have good reason to believe that.

SHARMINI PERIES: And Honduras, of course Argentina, Venezuela too, but let’s just dig into the Honduras case because I think that’s also left people’s memory.

MARK WEISBROT: Yes, well in 2009 there was a coup and the president was- in June of 2009, the president was flown out of the country in the middle of night. And he was overthrown, and the first statement that came out of the White House really foretold everything that was going to happen and showed what the real position of the United States was. Because it didn’t even condemn the coup. It just said all parties should work together and try and arrive at a solution. And when a military coup happens in the twenty-first century and you don’t even say anything bad about, and they knew it was coming as well. We found that out later. So clearly, they had time to prepare a statement. And they don’t even say anything’s wrong.

That was a massive signal to everyone that they supported it. And then, as the coup proceeded and the government needed to establish its legitimacy, the United States was practically alone in supporting the election that legitimated the coup later that year. And as I said, Hillary Clinton wrote in her memoirs that she helped make sure that the elected president didn’t go back, which was what almost all of Latin America wanted. And the U.S. manipulated the Organization of American States to prevent there from being stronger actions on their part to put Zelaya back in office. And in fact, out of that came the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, which the left governments created because of the U.S. manipulation of the OAS, and that includes all of the countries of the hemisphere except the U.S. and Canada.

SHARMINI PERIES: All right Mark, there’s much more to talk about because Latin America is known as a laboratory of the United States, its policies, and I’m sure we are feeling those laboratory experiments and their are reverberations throughout the world. We don’t have time to get into all of that, and we also didn’t talk about the media strategies involved in these kinds of political policy maneuvers on the part of the U.S. and how the media is used in that way or how media complies with it. But we’ll have to leave that for another time. I thank you so much for joining us today, Mark.

MARK WEISBROT: Thank you, Sharmini.

SHARMINI PERIES: And thank you for joining us here on the Real News Network.

© The Real News Network

Lawfare: Justice’s way to neoliberalism

Justice

Published originally by CELAG | 23 Jan 2018 | Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador

The judgement of Lula has been carried out as part of the huge case known as “Lava Jato”, which was the apparently legal cover by which the coup against ex-President Dilma Rousseff was implemented [1]. This judgement is part of a strategy of Lawfare, as the specialists have called it [2], which implies: the undue use of legal mechanisms for political persecution, the use of the law as a weapon to destroy political adversaries by judicial means [3]. The above describes a process of judicialization of politics from the top down, where the judiciary apparatus is raised above the legislature and the executive powers in a dynamic which could lead to a “dictatorship of the judges”, and a complete loss of the balance between the powers [4]. In order to work, this legal warfare requires the articulation with the media and social networks, which operate to manufacture consent either against or in favour of certain personalities, groups or political sectors [5]. The acceptance or elimination and demoralization of the political adversary is carried out especially in the field of public opinion [6].

One objective of Lawfare in the short and medium term is also to obtain the restoration of neoliberalism by judicial means.

The legitimacy given to the process of judicialization of politics derives from the consensus about corruption being the fundamental problem of Latin America [7]. This was manifested by the international financial institutions and US government agencies promoting the structural adjustment and modernization of the State in the 80’s and 90’s [8], but which in recent years has been presented as a problem endemic to progressive governments or so-called “left-wing populists” [9]. International analysts, think tanks and “experts” argue in favour of this vision, which tends to be reproduced by the hegemonic press, feeding a common feeling that, for example, corruption is the cause of poverty [10], above all in those countries under competing democratic, but allegedly authoritarian regimes (as in the cases of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador during the Correa government and Argentina during the Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner government) [11].

The principal thesis of their argument is that these governments, in giving a greater role to the State, in particular in regulation of the economy, in repoliticizing and revaluing the public sector, prioritizing the use of influences and public funds for personal benefit and the use of the powers of the State to avoid any accountability. This is considered as the principal cause of the rise in poverty [12] and of the weakening of democracy to such a point, that according to the “experts”, people are willing to even support a military dictatorship so as to put an end to crime and corruption [13].

This basis of argument and the existence of processes of legal warfare against ex-members of progressive governments demonstrate that there are other interests behind the supposed impartial combating of corruption. One of the short and medium term objectives of Lawfare is also to obtain the restoration of neoliberalism by judicial means. A state of exception is used as a means of supposedly legal mechanisms, as defined by a judicial apparatus which is raised above the other powers, but which in deed lead to the omission of the law in favour of the violent imposition of a new order [14]. This order tries to show itself a legal, “naturally” predisposed to the rendering of accounts and to transparency, which is to say against corrupt practices, following the logic and the “correct” way of doing things of the private sector, in being restricted to and run by businessmen transformed into politicians.

The objective of bringing in the neoliberal order can be seen in greater clarity in those cases where the legal strategy is used for the opposite of what is supposed, that is, when the legal apparatus is raised above the other powers and the legal mechanisms are manipulated to guarantee the status quo, partnering with media to silence certain cases and to avoid the exposure of certain personalities to public opinion. In this way consent is manufactured in favour of these personalities or groups who have been raised as the guardians of neoliberalism.

BRAZIL

Undue use of legal mechanisms and selectivity

The case against Lula shows various judicial adulterations to the rule of Law used for political ends. The weakness of the legal arguments, the inconsistency, has been obvious in this case. There has been distortion in the sentencing and throughout the whole period of instruction and dealings: 1) the presumption of innocence; 2) the impartiality of the judge; 3) the doctrinaire motivations in the legal rulings; 4) the prohibition of non-legal evidence; 5) the principle of equality or citizenship [15]; 6) the publicising of procedural acts; 7) the disallowing of full defence; 8) the requirement of natural jurisdiction. Furthermore, questions are raised such as: a) the abuse of the coercitive arrest; b) preventive imprisonment; c) the use of selective and partial evidence; d) the use of confessions in extreme conditions. To summarize: the 238 page sentence of Judge Sergio Moro, as various jurists have suggested [16], shows how a conviction of “exception” was constructed, which is the mark of a state of exception [17]

By way of example: the principal charge in Lula’s Lava Jato case is linked to the triplex apartment in Guaruja for passive corruption [18]. None of the 73 witnesses testifying in the 23 hearings brought information that corroborated the charge [19]. Lula’s appeal hearing was scheduled for January 24 was brought forward in front of seven cases awaiting processing in relation to Lava Jato. The official bodies argue that it is not necessary to deal with the cases “in chronological order” [20], but the more obvious conclusion is that the objective pf the judgement is to eliminate the possibility of Lula standing in the presidential elections.

Furthermore, there is the favouring of businessmen. Marcelo Odebrecht, the leading executive and magnate implicated and responsible for the Odebrecht corruption, was transferred to house arrest after completing just two years in prison on 19 December 2017 [21]. Another example is the covering up the existence of kickbacks in various projects linked to Odebrecht, in which Admiral Othon Luiz Pinheiro da Silva was sentenced to 43 years imprisonment [22]. These four decades contrast with the fact that the businessmen implicated in the same case were able to reduce their penalties to six years in prison, although the less favoured will be imprisoned for 20 years [23].

Corruption: Brazil’s main problem

The discourse that legitimizes the elimination of the political enemy, Lula, the Worker’s Party etc., is that of corruption. Sergio Moro, the judge running Operation Lava Jato, is portrayed as the hero who can clean up Brazilian politics [24]. However, there is a lack of deep cleaning: “on the ground, we are fighting against organized crime, (if not) with institutionalized crime” [25]. The media emphasize “this decisive action against crime and corruption of the political class is in turn marked as a more global phenomenon of rejection of the establishment and the calling to account of politicians” [26]. Corruption is the truly guilty party, which does not give worth to democracy: “the scenario is so horrible, that some Brazilians ask whether democracy and the elections can offer the possibility of remaking the country again on a good path” [27].

Lawfare as a violent way to neoliberalism

Since his arrival in government via the coup against Dilma Rousseff, Michel Temer has taken measures to substantially reduce social spending and to eliminate worker’s rights to benefit the business sector. A wave of privatizations has been implemented in a wide range of sectors: airports, ports, highways, electrical power and oil companies etc. [28] Among the long term objectives is the privatization of Petrobras, the state oil company which in large measure is the symbol and realization of sovereign policies in terms of economic, technological and defence policies during the Lula government [29].

The measures were accompanied by a restructuring of the laws in favour of the realignment, notably the labour and retirement system reforms hated by workers and celebrated by the business sector, as described in the hegemonic press [30]. The strikes and demonstrations against these neoliberal reforms were countered by the widespread repression of the security forces in the streets of the large cities [31].

ARGENTINA

Undue use of legal mechanisms and selectivity

The judicial persecution against members of the Cristina Kirchner government has been scaled up after the arrival of the Let’s Change policy of Mauricio Macri to the presidency. In recent months, in addition to the case against the ex-President, there have been judgements and preventive imprisonments against the ex-Foreign Minister Hector Timerman and ex-Vice President Armando Boudou.

The fact that those accused did not try to escape seems irrelevant given that the media spectacle is a fundamental part of this new form of warfare.

Abuse of the criteria for preventive arrest is notable as a mechanism to judicialize politics. In the abuse of this resource, various federal judges have ignored international conventions which the country has adhered to in its constitution, which explicitly state that the primary duty is the liberty of those accused during the process. In strictly juridical terms, at the instruction stage, the only reason for using preventive arrest is either the risk of escape or obstruction of the investigation by the accused person. Innocence or guilt comes at a later stage and has to be demonstrated at the court hearing.

There are various symptomatic cases in relation to the first premise. Peñafort and Rua, defence lawyers for the ex-Foreign Minister, Hector Timerman, argued in his appeal that the accused travelled frequently abroad for reasons of his medical treatment for liver cancer, and that he had always returned within the scheduled times as evidence of the lack of basis for his preventive imprisonment.

In the case of ex-Vice President Amado Boudou, the statement from the same expert highlighted that preventive imprisonment should be the exception rather than the rule, and that the accused always had rights. Nevertheless, the fact that those accused did not try to escape seems irrelevant given that the media spectacle is a fundamental part of this new form of warfare. By way of illustration, the government sent the police to the home of the ex-Minister of Planning, Julio De Vido, knowing that he was not at home, but the mass media used this photograph as if he had been arrested.

In relation to the second point, in cases of preventive imprisonment requested for members of the opposition, the judges did not describe the supposed influences, nor how justice might be obstructed. Furthermore, there is evident differential treatment for members of the Kirchner government, as in no case are the same measures taken for members of the current government.

As in the case of Brazil, in Argentina the businessmen involved are taken care of. At no time is business complicity examined, but only that of the government. One of the most scandalous cases is the granting of credit by President Mauricio Macri to his father in 2016, the businessman Franco Macri. The Macri Group acquired the Argentinean Post Office concession in the 1990’s until 2003, when Kirchner took it back into state ownership for lack of payment from March 2000. After 12 years of the Argentine government rejecting all the post-breakdown payment plans for excessive debts, with the arrival of Macri to the Presidency however, the State quickly accepted the receiving of just 1.18 % of the debt [32].

Corruption: the cancer of Kirchnerism

Ever since his taking office, President Macri has taken the opposite position in his administration to that of the Kirchners, with special emphasis on the combating of corruption. This was backed also by the like minded media, to such a point that the leading newspapers, Clarin and La Nación, introducing a specific tag “La corrupción K”. Mauricio Macri declared that now “there is less reporting and more truth”. In regard to the economic adjustment measures, he justified: “He came to the State devastated by corruption” [33], and, “…after a decade of pillage and corruption, we are normalizing the power service” [34]. In constructing the direction this government, every negative result of the application of its neoliberal policies uses the idea that this is the only possible way. A large part of the population has appropriated that idea thanks to the mass media which has imposed their agenda of persecution of the supposed ¨corruptos k¨ in our news every day.

The violent path to neoliberalism

In whitewashing his presidential aspirations, the Cambiemos alliance promised that if he were elected to the Casa Rosada “he would defend the institutions and republicanism”. Nevertheless, his arrival involved precisely the change activating the Judiciary that steamrollered the rule of law, to the point of rolling back basic guarantees in legitimate process and penalizing the political world, a state of exception. The Milagro Sala case is one of the most outstanding examples of this.

But the “exceptionality” has been there from the start. The economic measures affecting a large part of the population, some imposed by decree, were rejected by mass union and civil society protests. Under such pressure, the government put their repressive measures to the test. One important event was the march in support of Santiago Maldonado being found alive [35], where the police actions were newsworthy: 31 people were arrested arbitrarily, spending up to 48 hours in police stations, including tourists, journalists and photographers. But more significant was that during the demonstration against changes to the retirement and pension law in December 2017, demonstrators suffered police brutality, and the use of water cannons, tear gas, rubber bullets, once again being detained at random and having their homes broken into. Here again police were infiltrated among those starting the trouble.

ECUADOR

Undue use of legal mechanisms and selectivity

Judges in Ecuador have conducted a campaign against ex-Vice-President Jorge Glas, who was sentenced to six years in prison, the highest ranking public figure convicted in Latin America in the huge Odebrecht scandal, and against inner circle staff. Curiously, these “legal” suits have not touched the mayor of Quito, Mauricio Rodas, nor indicate investigating Guillermo Lasso, the candidate opposing Alianza País during the presidential elections, whom accusations point towards for receiving bribes from Odebrecht for the Quito metro contract [36], or for being immersed in the Panama Papers scandal –considering that most of the wealth of these politician businessmen is in offshore accounts [37].

It is important to remember that the legal case against ex-Vice-President Glas was begun after a message from the U.S. Justice Department notifying of payment of US$ 33.6 million from Odebrecht to corrupt public servants between 2007 and 2016 [38]. One message coinciding with the electoral campaign underway in December 2016 favoured the interests of the Guillermo Lasso and Andres Paez bid [39]. Both right-wing leaders were mentioned in numerous cables revealed by Wikileaks [40], placing them amongst the most privileged close informants in favour of United States interests [41].

Whilst ex-Vice-President Glas was convicted, those who provided most of the information to the U.S. Justice Department, were the Brazilian businessmen Jose C., Simoes P., Ricardo V. and Mauricio G., one time members of staff at Odebrecht and whose full names have not been published. No injunctions having been served against them, because the Ecuadorean prosecutors signed a cooperation agreement to provide information to gather evidence for investigations, and under article 494 of the Criminal Code, which states that injunctions must be suited to guarantee success of the investigations [42]. One fundamental detail to be taken into account is the expulsion of the Odebrecht company from Ecuador between 2008 and 2010, demanded by ex-President Rafael Correa, who took that decision for not Odebrecht not having complied with the engineering standards of the San Francisco hydroelectric dam, and due to indications of manipulation and corruption in the contracting processes, which the judge of the case did not take into account, and neither was this mentioned in the conventional media, which in due course criticized the expulsion measure of the Brazilian company as authoritarian [43].

Corruption: Correa’s “main problem”

From the beginning of his mandate, President Lenin Moreno initiated a set of actions to disassociate himself from his predecessor and party colleague, Rafael Correa. In an interview with a Spanish daily newspaper, he said he was “horrified, because (…) there had been rampant corruption, principally in the last period of the previous government (…) and apparently the President (Correa) had turned a blind eye on more than one occasion, because he was not thinking of the country, but rather of the next election” [44].

The interesting thing is that in Ecuador, the anti-corruption discourse has been transformed into a process of judicial persecution carried out by Lawfare, supported from the highest levels of the judiciary and with the backing of right-wing parties. The “problem of corruption” in Ecuador has taken on such a proportion for so many people, that it is to be included in the next referendum and plebiscite to be held in a fortnight.

The path to neoliberalism (with Lenin)

The process of judicialization of politics and persecution of members of the previous government has generated fertile ground for the “change”. Since he came to power, Lenin Moreno has put in place a series of neoliberal reforms, overturning Correa’s policies.

Moreno celebrated the visit from the IMF, and later said he would ask for their help, a warning message due to the implications of a change in direction of the country’s economic policy. He is disposed to hand over management of electronic money to a private bank, competing against the income generated by the Ecuador Central Bank in this area. Going against the recommendation by the National Assembly and the Economic Revitalization Law, this allows imports on a massive scale, leading to a significant reduction in the trading surplus in 2017, increasing imports by 21 % and weakening national production. Likewise, in the next plebiscite and referendum, the progressive value-added Law, which impedes land speculation in urban areas, is intended to be reversed [45]. It is no coincidence that in lockstep with this question in the plebiscite, the persecution of “corrupt” members of the previous government is included.

COLOMBIA

Little has been examined and even less published in the mass media about the way in which the Constitutional Court worked against the peace agreement, by making the discussion mechanism via FastTrack unsustainable, which impedes the advance in legislation towards the peace process and which has once again opened up the discussion on the key points of the agreement, placing the peace achieved thus far at risk.

Unlike the previous cases, in Colombia, the strategy of Lawfare is done inversely, using low intensity legal warfare, where the objective is the permanence and concealment, by over exposing certain cases, with the completely rotten from corruption justice system in collusion, impeding perception of the drivers and actors of a system that is now in crisis. The strategy of legal warfare is only of high intensity in the few cases where the left is able to occupy space in the formal political sphere, after combating paramilitary harassment and a merciless hostile media system. Only then are all the alarm bells set off and all the institutional and legal avenues activated to deal with the threat.

Undue use of legal mechanisms and selectivity

The so called judges cartel is an example of the use of justice for the benefit of the right-wing political caste linked to the corrupt and the criminal, which has been ensuring the guaranteeing of the well-being of neoliberalism. But this case is only the tip of the iceberg as there are many loose ends, and through the over exposure of some actors by the media ensures that people do not ask about the links between certain state and regional personalities with the heirs of the family dynasties that currently hold power. Santos, Lleras, Lopez, Gomez, Pastrana, are some of the most recurring names who have known how to handle political, judicial and communication institutions in their own interests.

This key role justice has played has been uncovered whereby certain judges worked in the Supreme Court of Justice in alliance with the Anti-corruption Prosecution Service, postponing and delaying legal processes against politicians linked to the paramilitaries or to cases of corruption, in exchange for spectacular amounts of money. That is not to mention the multiplicity of family businesses which have grown in the shadow of the illegal activity of the judges.

Corruption: the “problem with the left”

Corruption is presented as a disease of the left. This is the case of ex-mayor of Bogotá, Gustavo Petro, who is now a candidate for the Presidency, persecuted and turned out of office by the extreme right-wing prosecutor, Alejandro Ordoñez, whose rulings against the ex-mayor of the Progressive Movement were overturned by the Interamerican Human Rights Commission, allowing him to continue his mandate and by the State Council, which showed evidence three years later of the use of judicial warfare against the mayor.

Access to the Special Justice for Peace is denied to civilians committed to crimes against humanity, or to financiers or backers of the paramilitaries, and the political reform that promised a democratic opening was scuttled, with seats or blocks being denied to the victims in Congress, and the regulation of comprehensive land reform has not even been started, amongst other things [46].

On the other hand, the protection given by the judiciary and the media to certain people is quite clear in the case of Alvaro Uribe, who had more than 186 legal processes against him, including one about his use of the State-DAS intelligence apparatus to intimidate, persecute and spy on the opposition and neighbouring governments, or for the buying of votes in the Senate to enable his re-election in 2006. All the cases in the commission of inquiry remaining intact in the Chamber of Representatives have little possibility of being brought to any judgement due to it being made up of Uribe or ex-Uribe politicians [47].

Lawfare: part of the neoliberal status quo

Odebrecht has been documented to have financed the campaign of President Juan Manuel Santos when he was supported by Uribe in 2010, as well as having supported the campaigns of Santos and his main rival, the Uribe ally, Zuluaga in 2014 [48]. There are also investigations underway into the payment of bribes of at least US$ 31.5 million delivered to highly placed members of the Uribe and Santos governments in return for infra-structure contracts passed in 2006 and 2016 [49]. Nevertheless, not one of these members of the government has been charged, except for one deputy minister and three Senators, who are assisting inquiries and will be given light sentences, closing the Odebrecht mega-scandal with some mid-level leadership figures being convicted, but maintaining the status quo.

The use of the judicial apparatus to safeguard the instituted order of things has played a key role in a process where the responsibilities and miseries of neoliberal policies which has been operating for decades is evident [50], sustaining the same families in power and shielding political dynasties enjoying the benefits of the State despite being seen to have committed serious crimes [51]. The policy of reduction of the role of the State in its socio-economic dimension in favour of the historically marginalized, together with a growth in favour of the private sector is evident, which is well received by the mass media and is not investigated or questioned, considering that the corruption has two parties, those who give and those who receive, i.e. private companies and those associated with the State.

Corruption in the full neoliberal, privatized model, with the State reduced to the extreme, represents 4% of Colombian GDP, about US$ 17 billion a year according to data from the Colombian comptroller office [52]. This scheme depends on the impunity and on the connivance of the judicial system, the media and violence to repress critical voices, such as the 120 civil society movement leaders assassinated in 2017 [53]. This impunity associated with neoliberal policies in relation to the status quo is counselled by the United States, with reports of corruption cases involving “made in USA” companies as in the case of Reficar not being referred to public opinion [54]. The same applies to the Odebrecht case, both in Brazil and Ecuador. To the contrary, highly placed Colombian public servants convicted of corruption have been protected, as in the case of ex-Uribe minister Andres Felipe Arias [55].

[1]http://www.celag.org/lawfare-la-judicializacion-de-la-politica-en-america-latina/

[2]http://lawfareinstitute.com/publications/

[3] https://thelawfareproject.org/lawfare/what-is-lawfare-1/

[4]https://www.cidob.org/content/download/58165/1509781/…/1/…/domingo_85-86.pdf

[5]Herman, Edward and Chomsky, Noam. Manufacturing consent. The political economy of the mass media. New York: Pantheon, 1988

[6]http://www.celag.org/lawfare-la-judicializacion-de-la-politica-en-america-latina/

[7]http://www.celag.org/la-corrupcion-problema-america-latina-2/

[8]https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/international-support-for-justice-reform-latin-america-worthwhile-or-worthless

[9]https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2016/11/economist-explains-12

[10]https://blogs.imf.org/2017/09/21/corruption-in-latin-america-taking-stock/

[11] https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/latin-america%E2%80%99s-authoritarian-drift-threat-populist-left

[12]https://blogs.imf.org/2017/09/21/corruption-in-latin-america-taking-stock/

[13]http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/23/populism-is-coming-for-latin-america-in-2018/

[14]Sotelo Felipe, M. (2018) “Lawfare, this crime call justice”. In Proner, C., Citadino, G., Ricobom, G. and Dornelles, J. Comments on a notorious verdict. The Trial of Lula. CLACSO https://www.clacso.org.ar/libreria-latinoamericana/libro_detalle.php?id_libro=1338&orden=&pageNum_rs_libros=0&totalRows_rs_libros=1256

[15] Equality is the concept of equal civil and political rights if citizens.

[16] Carol Proner et al. (orgs.) Comentarios a uma sentença anunciada: o Processo Lula. Bauru: Canal 6, 2017.

[17]Sotelo Felipe, M. (2018) “Lawfare, this crime call justice”. In Proner, C.; Citadino, G.; Ricobom, G. and Dornelles, J. Comments on a notorious verdict. The trial of Lula. CLACSO.

[18] http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-40589237

[19] https://www.alainet.org/es/articulo/190468

[20] https://www.telesurtv.net/news/Brasil-Caso-de-Lula-pasa-por-delante-de-otras-7-actions-de-Lava-Jato-20180108-0034.html

[21] http://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2017/12/19/marcelo-odebrecht-sale-de-la-carcel-para-cumplir-prision-domiciliaria/

[22]https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/835/brazils-nuclear-power-program-undone-corruption

[23] http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,justica-condena-ex-presidente-da-eletronuclear-a-43-anos-de-prisao,10000066863

[24] https://www.nytimes.com/es/2017/08/30/juez-sergio-moro-java-lato-lula-brasil/?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Findex

[25] http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2014/12/141209_brasil_juez_escandalo_petrobras_perfil_gl

[26] http://www.pulsamerica.co.uk/2016/11/corruption-charges-and-the-decline-of-populism-latin-americas-rejection-of-its-political-class/

[27] http://themercury.com/endless-corruption-is-a-cancer-in-brazil/article_c2c826b7-75c8-526a-8c6a-862c956cb32f.html

[28] https://www.telesurtv.net/telesuragenda/Privatizations-en-Brasil-20170906-0038.html

[29] http://www.celag.org/brasil-and-el-cono-sur-en-la-geopolitica-estadounidense/

[30] http://www.eleconomista.es/economia/noticias/8737826/11/17/Brasil-estrena-una-reforma-laboral-odiada-por-los-sindicatos-and-festejada-por-las-empresas.html

[31] https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2017/04/28/barricadas-protestas-and-huelga-general-contra-las-reformas-impulsadas-por-michel-temer-en-brasil/

[32]http://www.lanoticiaweb.com.ar/noticia/47193/mauricio-es-fue-and-sera-siempre-macri

[33]http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1920318-encontre-un-estado-devastado-por-la-corrupcion-and-otras-frases-destacadas-de-mauricio-macri

[34]https://www.clarin.com/politica/apertura-sesiones-ordinarias-mauricio-macri-dijo-ahora-relato-verdad_0_H1Nd98E5g.html

[35]http://www.celag.org/santiago-maldonado-desdibujando-al-estado-derecho/

[36]https://www.telesurtv.net/telesuragenda/Lasso-and-Rodas-apellidos-del-escandalo-Odebrecht-en-Ecuador-20170316-0034.html

[37]https://www.pagina12.com.ar/27029-lasso-en-jaque-por-los-negocios-en-panama

[38] https://www.nacion.com/el-mundo/politica/corte-constitucional-de-ecuador-acepta-judge/J2G7EIQVU5GSDCZGM443NLBJDE/story/

[39]http://www.vistazo.com/seccion/country-politica-nacional/politica-nacional/paez-analiza-ir-eeuu-por-informacion-de-caso

[40]https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07QUITO768_a.html

[41] http://www.eltelegrafo.com.ec/noticias/politica/2/investigacion-revela-presunto-vinculo-de-paez-con-stanford

[42] http://www.celag.org/la-corrupcion-problema-america-latina-2/

[43] http://www.ecuadorinmediato.com/index.php?module=Noticias&func=news_user_view&id=2818813271

[44] http://www.abc.es/internacional/abci-lenin-moreno-estoy-espeluznado-corrupcion-galopante-government-correa-201712140224_noticia.html

[45] http://www.celag.org/ecuador-regreso-una-economia-tutelada/

[46]http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/fast-track-corte-constitucional-tumba-voto-en-bloque/525563

[47]http://www.elcountry.com.co/colombia/alvaro-uribe-velez-tiene-mas-de-186-procesos-en-la-comision-de-acusacion.html

[48] http://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2017/07/13/fiscalia-de-colombia-asegura-que-odebrecht-asumio-gastos-de-campanas-de-santos-and-zuluaga/ and http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/fiscal-hay-evidencia-certera-del-ingreso-de-dinero-de-odebrecht-a-campana-de-oscar-ivan-zuluaga/544784

[49]http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/investigacion/la-ruta-de-los-sobornos-de-odebrecht-en-colombia-113000

[50] http://www.celag.org/la-crisis-neoliberal-and-la-paz-en-colombia-por-javier-calderon-castillo/

[51] https://www.elespectador.com/elections-2018/noticias/politica/los-candidatos-mal-rodeados-articulo-727973

[52] http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/delitos/precio-de-la-corrupcion-en-colombia-61749

[53] https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/paz/mas-de-120-lideres-comunales-han-sido-asesinados-en-2017-articulo-724083

[54] http://caracol.com.co/programa/2016/01/28/6am_hoy_por_hoy/1453984041_656591.html

[55] http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/investigacion/vinculacion-de-andres-felipe-arias-con-caso-odebrecht-esta-en-manos-de-la-fiscalia-119426

Leaked video shows clear bias in Lava Jato prosecution

sergio-moro-lava-jato.jpg

Image: Sergio Moro from: Wikipedia

| By BRIAN MIER

Extramural Contributor at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

As ex-president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva continues his appeal against charges of bribery that revolve around the gift of a beachfront apartment which courts were unable to prove he either owned or set foot on a property to a series of graver corruption misdeeds that led to charges against important members of the neoliberal Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social Democrat Party, PSDB), which governed Brazil from 1994-2002, have been dismissed by the Brazilian judiciary.[i] During the past month, two of the PSDB’s most powerful politicians, Jose Serra and Aecio Neves, filed motions for dismissal of charges related to the misappropriation of millions of dollars of funds. On January 24, Federal Public Prosecutor Raquel Dodge requested that the Supreme Court dismiss corruption charges against Serra, PDSB’s 2010 presidential candidate, for receiving over $2 million in off-the-books campaign donations from JBS meat packing company, on grounds of the senator’s advanced age.[ii] On January 26, the Supreme Court dismissed Lava Jato related charges against Neves, PDSB’s 2014 presidential candidate, for receiving millions of dollars in bribes from Petrobras, the Brazilian national petroleum company. For Neves, this was one in a series of multi-million dollar charges which came in the wave of the anti-corruption Lavo Jato crusade, that have been dismissed since he was thrown out of, then reinstated to the Senate in 2017.[iii] [iv] [v]

The vast disparity in the due process observed between the Worker’s Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) and conservative opposition parties has raised serious doubts about the motives behind the Lava Jato investigation itself. Even the Brazilian Army stepped into the debate, recently posting an article on its web site accusing Judge Sergio Moro and his Lava Jato investigation team of destroying encryption codes to five computer hard drives seized from Brazilian construction company Odebrecht’s Swiss offices which reportedly contained the entire history of its bribes paid out to government officials.[vi] [vii] This evidence, the author said, would enable prosecutors to build a legitimate case against politicians who had been accused rather than having to rely exclusively on plea bargains, most of which have resulted in vastly reduced sentences and partial retention of assets for collaborators.[viii] Meanwhile, former Odebrecht lawyer Tacla Duran has accused the Lava Jato defense team of fabricating evidence and building a “sentence reduction selling industry”, an accusation which appears credible despite its biased source, due to the fact that the law firm of Sergio Moro’s wife has negotiated plea bargain deals with Moro and his team as part of the Lava Jato investigation.[ix] On February 16, as evidence continued to showing partisan bias and corruption within the Lava Jato investigation itself, a video surfaced in which Pedro Barusco, former Petrobras director, admits that he started collecting bribes in 1996, during the PDSB presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso , but that the Lava Jato prosecution team asked him to confess only to bribes received after Lula became president in 2003.

Pedro Barusco’s case is one of many that raises questions about how the plea bargains were negotiated by Sergio Moro’s prosecution team. Originally sentenced to 47 years, Barusco negotiated a plea bargain which lowered his sentence to 15, then, without serving a day of time, he was put under limited house arrest, which only requires him to be at home between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m.

The translated transcripts of the video read as follows:

Cristiano Zanin (Lula’s Defense Lawyer): You say here that you began to receive these undue advantages in 1997, correct?

Pedro Barusco: There may be a bit of imprecision in my statement, it could have been 1996, or 1998, but it was during this period.

Zanin: You also mentioned in your testimony today, that there is a spreadsheet that you created during the period in which you were negotiating your plea bargain deal with the public prosecutors. Correct?

Barusco: No, I made the spreadsheet during the period in which I was giving my testimony. I had already signed the plea bargain deal by that time.

Zanin: OK. So you had already made the deal with the public prosecutors’ office and so when you began your testimony you created this spreadsheet, correct?

Barusco: Correct.

Zanin: So I will ask you, if you started receiving undue advantages in 1996, why does your spreadsheet start in 2003?

Barusco: (long pause) Because of the following. Let me explain how I made the spreadsheet. I left Petrobras, after a period of 8 years as the executive director of engineering. So, when I left, I decided to make a recording, I made an official request to the computer department, they made a backup for me, OK, because I had many documents, I had signed a lot of documents of all kinds. So I asked them to make a copy of it and I had this copy. And these management acts of mine started in 2003 when I took over the engineering department, so I based my spreadsheet from 2003 to 2011 which is when I left. During the period before 2003, this issues were basically covered in another deal that I made in Rio de Janeiro involving bribes paid by the Dutch company SBM, so this part before 2003 was the objective of this other plea bargaining process in Rio de Janeiro.

Zanin: OK, but in reality you started receiving undue advantages before 2003. This spreadsheet does not reflect the entire period in which you received undue advantages.

Barusco: Obviously.

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bPyGERmhdX8

This is not the first time that the Lava Jato investigation team has ignored corruption allegations that took place during Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s presidency. In June 2016, during a plea bargain by former Petrobras director Nestor Cerveró, he told investigators that they paid a $100 million bribe to cabinet members in Cardoso’s government in 2002, during the Petrobras acquisition of Pérez Companc, an Argentine petroleum company.[x]

In March 2016, Delcídio do Amaral, Petrobras director from 1999 to 2001, testified about corruption schemes going from the Itamar Franco presidency through Fernando Henrique Cardoso, including $100 million in kickbacks to government officials during construction of an offshore oil drilling platform, which took place between 1995 and 2000.[xi] The platform sunk in 2001, killing 11 workers. [xii]

Lava Jato prosecution judge Sergio Moro has close ties with the US State Department and is a frequent speaker at neoliberal think tanks in the US such as the Wilson Center and AS/COA. At one speech at the Wilson Center in July 2016, Moro was asked about his refusal to prosecute corrupt politicians from the PSDB, to which he replied “This Party was in the opposition, so it wouldn’t make sense.”. [xiii] At the time he made the speech,however, two time presidential election runner up for the PSDB, José Serra, was serving as Brazil’s Minister of Foreign Relations. [xiii]

Moro’s justification for not prosecuting members of the PSDB seems suspicious since his wife Rosangela, whose law firm (Zucolotto Associados, ZA) negotiates Lava Jato plea bargains with corrupt businessmen, has also worked as legal advisor to Flavio Arns, Vice-Governor of Paraná for the PSDB. In another apparent conflict of interest, at the outset of the Lava Jato investigation ZA represented petroleum companies who directly benefit from the breakup of Petrobras, including INGRAX and Royal Dutch Shell. [xiv]

Despite the serious conflicts of interest within the Lava Jato investigation Sergio Moro continues to be treated as a hero in the American business community. On March 2, the corporate-funded think tank AS/COA, which recently held a private meeting with neo-fascist presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro, will hold an event honouring Latin America’s “top corruption fighters,” featuring a speech by Moro.[xv]

Additional editorial support provided by ALINE PIVA, Research Fellow, and KEITH A. CARR, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs.

To view the original Council of Hemispheric Affairs article online, please click here.

References
[i] https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/23/opinion/brazil-lula-democracy-corruption.html
[ii]http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,raquel-dodge-pede-arquivamento-de-inquerito-contra-serra-no-stf,70002164386
[iii]http://www.nocaute.blog.br/brasil/pedido-de-investigacao-contra-aecio-neves-e-arquivado-no-stf.html
[iv] https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/2017/10/17/senado-devolve-mandato-a-aecio-neves
[v]http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2017/05/1885480-jbs-diz-que-pagou-r-60-milhoes-em-propina-para-aecio-neves-em-2014.shtml
[vi]http://www.brasilwire.com/brazilian-army-why-is-the-lava-jato-team-burying-evidence/
[vii]For example, Alberto Yousseff is expected to recuperate R$20 million as part of his plea bargain (https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/youssef-pode-recuperar-ate-20-milhoes-com-delacao-premiada-15143551)
[viii]http://www.brasilwire.com/corrupt-lava-jato-sergio-moros-sentence-reduction-industry/
[ix]http://www.brasilwire.com/corrupt-lava-jato-sergio-moros-sentence-reduction-industry/
[x] https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/cervero-relatou-propinas-de-mais-de-meio-bilhao-de-reais-desde-2002-19447940
[xi]https://noticias.terra.com.br/brasil/politica/lava-jato/em-delacao-delcidio-relata-corrupcao-na-petrobras-nos-governos-de-itamar-e-fhc,17d81a5ef81954267f3965d1a1dbb147nqvmtoaq.html
[xii]http://acervo.oglobo.globo.com/fatos-historicos/em-2001-explosao-da-plataforma-36-deixou-11-mortos-na-bacia-de-campos-9483525
[xiii]http://www.redebrasilatual.com.br/blogs/helena/2017/12/jose-serra-e-aloysio-nunes-estao-perto-de-se-livrar-de-investigacao-de-propinas
[xiv]https://www.cartamaior.com.br/?/Editoria/Politica/Esposa-de-Juiz-da-lava-Jato-e-assessora-juridica-de-Vice-de-Beto-Richa-PSDB-/4/32372

UN pronounces officially: Lula has the right to be a candidate

Zanin press conference

Lula`s lawyers at the press conference after the UN Human Rights Committee decision

The UN Human Rights Committee just pronounced officially that Lula has the right to be a candidate for President. The UN requested that the Brazilian State “take all necessary measures to ensure the author [Lula] enjoy and exercise his political rights while in prison, as candidate in the 2018 presidential elections, including appropriate access to the media and to members of his political party” and also to “not to prevent the author [Lula] from standing in the 2018 presidential elections, until pending applications for review against his conviction have been completed in fair judicial proceedings and the conviction has become final”.

The UN Committee recognized the violation of Lula’s human rights and that he is possible “irreparable harm” to the author’s rights. According to the ex-President’s lawyers, “no body of the Brazilian State can place any obstacle for ex-President Lula to stand in the presidential elections”.

Read the entire official press release from Lula’s lawyers:

Today (17/08/2016) the UN Human Rights Committee upheld the motion for an injunction we formulated as lawyers for ex-President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva on 25/07/2018, jointly with Geoffrey Robertson QC, and requested that the Brazilian State “take all necessary measures to ensure the author [Lula] enjoy and exercise his political rights while in prison, as candidate in the 2018 presidential elections, including appropriate access to the media and to members of his political party” and also to “not to prevent the author [Lula] from standing in the 2018 presidential elections, until pending applications for review against his conviction have been completed in fair judicial proceedings and the conviction has become final”.

The decision recognizes the existence of violation of art. 25 of the UN Covenant of Civil Rights and the occurrence of irreparable harm to Lula in the attempt to stop him from standing in the presidential elections and in denying him unrestricted access to the media and to members of his political coalition during the campaign.

Brazil incorporated the juridical Protocol into its statutes which recognizes the jurisdiction of the UN Human Rights Committee and the mandatory nature of its decisions by Decree no. 6.949/2009.

Given this new decision, no body of the Brazilian State can place any obstacle for ex-President Lula to stand in the presidential elections until there is a definitive ruling in a fair process, as well as ensuring him unrestricted access to the media and to members of his political coalition during the campaign.

Valeska Teixeira Zanin Martins and Cristiano Zanin Martins

From https://www.brasil247.com/pt/247/poder/365620/ONU-pronuncia-se-oficialmente-Lula-tem-direito-de-ser-candidato.htm

Interpol accuses Sergio Moro of violation of human rights

doria-moro
Photo: William Volcov

By Miguel do Rosário

Jorunalist Bob Fernandes alerted, via Twitter:

CLOSE ATTENTION. In article 54 one of the reasons of Interpol withdrawing Tacla Duran from the red alert list: doubts about the conduct of the judge responsible (Moro) sufficient to violate article 2; cooperation can only be given with fundamental rights guaranteed. https://t.co/l3UsvQcs04

— Bob Fernandes (@Bob_Fernandes) 4 August 2018

Interpol understood that Sergio Moro violated article 2 of Interpol’s own Constitution.

Article 2 (1): To ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the different countries and in the spirit of the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights

From the newspaper O Estado de S.Paulo

Interpol takes Tacla Duran off the international wanted list

The investigation agency complied with a request from the lawyer and suspended the international red alert against his name since September 2016

Jamil Chade CORRESPONDENT / GENEVER Katna Baran, O Estado de S.Paulo

4 August 2018

Interpol, the international investigation agency, took the lawyer Rodrigo Tacla Duran off the body’s international wanted list. At the request of the defence, the agency suspended the red alert against his name since September 2016 made at the request of Brazilian Justice. Tacla Duran’s defence placed in check the impartiality of Judge Sérgio Moro to judge the case. The argument was the fact that the judge had cited the lawyer during the programme Roda Viva on TV Cultura.

Tacla Duran presented three arguments to Interpol to justify his request that the red alert on his name be withdrawn: his case had been transferred in part from Brazil to Spain, the rights to due legal process in Brazil had not been fulfilled and to complete the case, Spain had rejected his extradition from there.

According to Interpol, Tacla Duran presented “evidence that was easily verifiable from open sources”, that Moro “spoke publicly about him during an interview” about the case, placing the impartiality of the Lava Jato judge in Curitiba under suspicion.

“The Commission then considered that the allegations presented (by Tacla Duran) which, given the behaviour of the judge responsible for his case in Brazil, sufficient doubts had been raised of the fact of a violation of Article 2 of the Interpol Constitution”, the agency indicated in a document obtained by O Estado. Article 2 refers to the need for the institution to promote cooperation between police from different countries, provided the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is respected.

The case makes reference to the interview given by Moro on Roda Viva on the TV Cultura channel on 27th March. As a fugitive in Spain, Duran accused Moro of receiving undue amounts of money through a friend to favour plea bargains in the operation. In the interview on Roda Viva, the judge said he believed it was just an attempt to remove him from the case.

The Interpol Control Commission has been evaluating the case since July. After an evaluation and in consultation with authorities in Brazil and Spain, the newspaper O Estado found that the commission indicated that the elements presented by Tacla Duran were in fact “new” and would have to be considered. According to the agency, such data could have led Interpol to a “different conclusion” about the suspect.

The decision does not mean that Interpol questions the Brazilian judicial system. But it does indicate that an evaluation should be made on each case before maintaining the lawyer’s name on the list. “The Commission notes that the guarantees of Access to Justice, as well as principles of equal treatment before the law, the impartiality of the Judiciary and fundamental rights, such as full and adversarial defence are in fact rooted in the Brazilian Federal Constitution and in the country’s legal system”.

The agency therefore established that the data on Tacla Duran must be “deleted from the Interpol files”. The body also noted that Spanish Justice “did not ask for the alert to be maintained”.

Tacla Duran has lived in Spain ever since the first indications of his involvement in the corruption scheme at Petrobras were revealed by Lava Jato. According to the investigations, the lawyer was an operator for Odebrecht in the payments of bribe monies abroad. Firstly, he was the subject of a preventive arrest warrant in the 36th phase of Lava Jato in November 2016. At the time, Tacla Duran was already out of the country and was not arrested.

He is wanted in a process of investigating crimes such as corruption, money laundering and criminal conspiracy in a scheme involving construction works worth more than R$ 1.8 billion with the Pipe-Rack Consortium at the Rio de Janeiro Petrochemical Complex (Comperj).  He is also a defendant in another process, also dismembered, investigating crimes of corruption against Petrobras and an investigation involving concession and highways in Paraná state.

The 13th Court of Curitiba requested the extradition of Tacla Duran to Brazil for crimes, which was denied by Spain due to the lawyer double nationality. On April 11th 2018, Moro decided to transfer part of this process to the Spanish authorities, considering treaty provisions and the use of a company set up in Spain to carry out the crimes investigated.

Interpol refused to comment officially on the document. Federal Justice affirmed that his preventive detention had not been revoked in Brazil. The media office said they would not comment officially on the matter involving Moro, nor on the Interpol decision.

The Federal prosecution service declared that the preventive arrest warrant against Tacla Duran remained in effect and valid. In a motion for habeas corpus filed by the lawyer, the 4th Federal Regional Court (TRF-4) maintained the warrant, recognizing its legality. “The Federal prosecution service continues to adopt all due legal measures for it to be fulfilled, including abroad”.

After hours of expectation and the dust having settled on Lula’s possible release

Moro vision test
Comment by Rafaela Pacheco on Facebook

After hours of expectation and the dust having settled on Lula’s possible release, some points:
Regardless of the result, it was a masterly defence. Fact.
In a single movement they managed:
1. To put Lula top trending worldwide and on the cover of the leading international media outlets. They got him out of being forgotten in the dungeons of Curitiba. Lula is alive and well, to the fright of the nihilists and despair of the coup plotters.
2. They mobilized the activists on this post-World Cup Sunday. These activists had been kind of lost and withered after the defeat of Brazil, and needed to be shaken up. Demonstrations throughout Brazil and next week too.
3. Moro and company revealed, they took the bait desperately all the way to the stomach, as usual.
4. They exposed the whole Brazilian judicial system and its habitual Godfather ways more entrenched than ever post-coup. An international embarrassment.
5. The corporate media were shown to have no clothes, in their ridiculous role and failing credibility.
6 . They constructed a new fact for a further undertaking in the Supreme Court. The obvious partiality against Lula made blindingly so for those who want to see and becomes a new political and juridical fact.
There was a victory. They were geniuses! We moved the board, we got ourselves off the ropes. And they were in despair. Rightly so. They can already feel the signs.
The spring must come.
And I’m going to die laughing, that day is coming sooner than you think.

“Lula knew it wasn’t going to work, from the posture from Justice and the media”

Lula Gulliver

Interview: Lígia Bonfanti / Editor: André Zanardo

“He is serene. From the attitude that justice and the media have adopted, he already knew that it was practically impossible”. This was how the ex-Minister of Justice Eugênio Aragão described the state of spirit of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, after the episodes on Sunday 8 June, in an exclusive interview with Justificando.

The conversation with Justificando took place after the visit by Aragão to the Federal Police Superintendency where he met with and talked to Lula. The ex-Minister gathered the facts that took place on Sunday, and classified the activities of the rapporteur of the process against Lula in the 4th Federal Regional Court, Pedro Gebran Neto, of Judge Sérgio Moro and of the President of the 4th Federal Regional Court, Carlos Eduardo Thompson Flores, as “acting like kids”.

Lula was to wait in Curitiba for the Court’s decision, because he knew that the duty judge’s decision is absolutely transitory. But they resolved to jump in head first and thus trample on all the rules of jurisdiction and competence.

Unlike the ex-President, Aragão was not calm during the interview, and was strongly critical of the judges, who as far as he is concerned, unduly interfered in the case, clearly revealing the practice of “lawfare” against Lula.

I do believe that Moro, Gebran and Thompson Flores should answer for this to the National Council of Justice, and if justice is to be taken seriously in Brazil, they should be punished administratively for what they got up to yesterday. This is shamelessness, everyone should be dumbfounded. I have worked for over 35 years in Justice, and I have never seen anything like it. I have never seen anything like this before. As far as I am concerned, this is scandalous. They threw justice into the mud. They should have been patient. Where could Lula run to?

Eugenio Aragão

Photo: Lula Marques / Agência PT

See the interview in full:

How was your talk with President Lula?

He is serene, tranquil. In fact, in this time he has spent in prison, he has acquired the patience of a Tibetan monk, a tranquillity. At the outset he knew this was practically impossible, from the posture from Justice and the media have systematically adopted against him, so he was not there nursing any hope or anything. He was tranquil, really very tranquil.

How was Lula’s day yesterday throughout this whole episode? Was there any actual movement?

No, at no time was he anxious or anything, he was laughing, he thought this whole situation was funny, and he was accompanying it, sometimes on television, sometimes with the police who came to tell him of this whole attitude of “revoke, don’t revoke”. So he was accompanying the whole thing, but he was very tranquil, very serene. I think he will, at the right time, write a letter manifesting his position.

What is your evaluation on the events of yesterday?

The truth is that amongst all those who manifested themselves yesterday in this whole process, the only one who was right was the duty appeal judge Rogério Favreto, because he undoubtedly had the jurisdiction as the duty appeal judge.

The question was not at all about what had been judged, it was something completely new. What was being discussed was Lula’s right to campaign for the election. So this was what was being put, nobody was talking about provisional execution of time to be served or anything, it was a completely new question. So there was no overlapping with the other judgements.

But Judge Sergio Moro, there from Portugal, became involved without the process to hand, without paper or anything. He starts making calls desperately, calls the superintendent here in Brazil not to obey the order from the appeal judge. Then he issues a completely senseless dispatch, because he could not even say that he “thought” he had the jurisdiction. Because a week and a half ago he was told off by the Supreme Court Justice Dias Toffoli in relation to José Dirceu, because after the Supreme Court ordered the release of Dirceu, he demanded that Dirceu should wear an ankle monitor. At that time Toffoli had already told him he had no jurisdiction. This situation of Lula was identical. He had already been told off for this. Now he decided on a show-down, that is, really decided on sedition. This is sedition, what he did. Really, he decided to face-off against the appeal judge.

And curiously, the strangest thing is that at 9:24 in the morning the system showed the certificate here that the decision had been made to release Lula. The “counter-order” from Moro was given at mid-day. So from 9:24 to mid-day, why did the Federal Police not release him? That means something very strange was going on: the phone calls. If you can reverse a written order by a duty judge by telephone, what justice is this? Then the lines hum. Moro makes a call to Gebran, calls Carlos Eduardo Thompson Flores, in this desperate frenzy. This is not the posture of a judge. This might be the posture of a politician, but a judge should never behave this way. A judge who behaves this way is not impartial, and thus he becomes a judge arousing suspicions, and he cannot conduct this process. That is obvious.

And as if that were not enough, he “consults” – in quotation marks, as there is no such thing in procedural law, without any jurisdiction, as he is on holiday, and even if he was not, he would have no jurisdiction, because the cognitive phase of the process has already ended. He “consults” the rapporteur, Gebran, who curiously recognizes this “consultation”, which is a non-existent act, and uses this “consultation” to give a “counter-order” in relation to the decision of the duty judge, who had the jurisdiction for the case, as Gebran was off-duty.

The correct thing to do was for the duty judge to decide, release Lula, the next day the process would go to the rapporteur, and the rapporteur would obviously give the counter-order. But no, when he was off-duty he simply goes there and gives the counter-order against the decision of the duty judge. In other words he also crossed the line.

But that is not all. Favreto goes back and affirms his competence, and he is quite right, as he is the only one with the competence at that moment, and he gives one hour for the Federal Police to fulfill the release order. Now, the whole of Brazil already knows he has given this order. The Federal Police turned a deaf ear, because behind the scenes was the Chief, Rogério Galloro, knowing through Justice Raul Jungmann that the order was not to be obeyed, because the President of the 4th Federal Regional Court, Thompson Flores had already called saying “I will decide later, hold him”. Once again, Carlos Eduardo Thompson Flores acted outside his jurisdiction, profoundly infringing jurisdictional ethics and worse, without being aware of the arguments in the case records.

So appeal judge Thompson Flores had no jurisdiction over the case?

He had no jurisdiction and did not know what it was about. The one who was speaking for the Court at that moment was Favreto. He orders Lula to be held and only at eight o’clock at night does he give his decision and in doing so, has the orders of a colleague of his disobeyed. This is a big mess, there’s no other name for it. This is stuff of kids. This is stuff of children. There is no other expression to describe what happened.

I do believe that Moro, Gebran and Thompson Flores should answer for this to the National Council of Justice, and if justice is to be taken seriously in Brazil, they should be punished administratively for what they got up to yesterday. This is shamelessness, everyone should be dumbfounded. I have worked for over 35 years in Justice, and I have never seen anything like it. I have never seen anything like this before. As far as I am concerned, this is scandalous. They threw justice into the mud. They should have been patient. Where could Lula run to? He probably wouldn’t even have left Curitiba, because he’s an educated man, he knows there are limits. Lula was to wait in Curitiba for the Court’s decision, because he knew that the duty judge’s decision is absolutely transitory. But they resolved to jump in head first and thus trample on all the rules of jurisdiction and competence.

Much has been said about the friendship between Gebran and Moro, and the impossibility of Gebran being the rapporteur of the case.

On this matter I have no great knowledge, but I heard that there is a Whataspp group between Gebran, Moro, Fachin and everyone who had dealings with the process. If that is true, that is something that is truly horrendous, because that subverts the whole rule of double jurisdiction. If the first, the second and the third instance of jurisdiction are arranging between themselves, then what is the law of double jurisdiction if that exists? Nothing. In other words, give the ruling at the first instance and then have everything arranged between themselves.

You said yesterday that Lula was “kidnapped”.

Yes, because when there is a legitimate order to release President Lula and he is held in captivity, at the whim of magistrates without jurisdiction, he is not imprisoned legitimately, he is kidnapped, he is being held in false imprisonment. He is kidnapped. This is not a legitimate prison. Legitimate prison presupposes that it has been ordered by a competent, impartial authority instituted by law. In this case, there was nothing of the sort. There was a judge in a bathing costume in Portugal, giving orders from his thighs, and another here in Brazil attending to the clamour from his friend. This is not the act of a judge, this is false imprisonment. This is kidnapping by an articulated group, which if it were some other kind of activity could be called a criminal organization.