Category Archives: Latin America

In the style of Moro – spying and extortion to persecute Cristina Kirchner

carlos-stornelli-marcelo-dalessio

Carlos Stornelli (left), Marcelo D’Alessio (right)

Argentinean federal judge Alejo Ramos Padilla charged the false lawyer Marcelo D’Alessio as a member of an illegal organisation “dedicated to carrying out intelligence and psychological operations against various persons who were then blackmailed or coerced, until they panicked, finally declaring themselves in a certain way and becoming “repentant witnesses”, the Argentinean version of the “plea bargains” so common in the Brazilian Operation Car Wash (Lava-Jato).

The key point in this case is that the judge considers there to be an accord between the intelligence services and the Justice Department that goes against the democratic system using blackmail, coercion, dossiers, distortion and false lawyers demanding money of people, and furthermore, to set up and run judicial cases.

All this is very similar to the judicial scheme carried out in Brazil by the ex-judge Sergio Moro (now recompensed with the post of Minister of Justice in the government of Jair Bolsonaro), regarding bribes linked to the multinational Odebrecht, which had the aim of imprisoning ex-President Lula da Silva and of impeding him from participating in the elections. In the Argentinean case, they are seeking the imprisonment of ex-President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, to stop her from running against the current President Mauricio Macri seeking re-election in October.

In the 220 pages of his resolution, Judge Ramos Padilla showed there was a close link between the prosecutor Carlos Stornelli (an Argentinean Deltan Dallagnol) and the supposed lawyer D’Alessio, evident from the many messages and audios exchanged over Whatsapp, and by a four hour meeting between them at the Pinamar resort, as well as handwritten messages in notebooks seized during investigations. Due to this, the magistrate requested the Prosecution Service to investigate the prosecutor, and to begin the due process, if considered pertinent.

In this first resolution, the task is to describe the mechanisms of the crime, as to how Stornelli and D’Alessio extorted the businessman Pedro Etchebest, or how they used a hidden camera against the lawyer José Manuel Ubeira, or used the “repentant witness” statement of Leonardo Fariña, or coerced an ex-member of staff of the Venezuelan state company PDVSA to declare himself repentant.

Despite Stornelli refusing to hand over his mobile phones to enable the frequency and kind of contacts with D’Alessio to be determined – who is the nephew of the Clerk-General of the government, Carlos Marcelo D’Alessio – a third businessman appeared denouncing D’Alessio for extortion and involving the lawyer Rodrigo Gonzalez and the judicial operator of the newspaper Clarín, Daniel Santoro, although they have denied the charge.

The meeting place of the four, Stornelli, D’Alessio, Gonzalez and Santoro, was the restaurant El Obrero, decorated with photos of President Macri. Its owner is a partner in another business venture, of Charly Liñani – denounced by the ex-presidential secretary Pablo Barreiro, of the Cristina Kirchner government, for attempted extortion, committed together with D’Alessio and Gonzalez, as revealed by the journalist Horacio Verbitsky on his site Cohete a la Luna.

The messages and audios also show attempts to use Leonardo Fariña, forcing him to make the declarations required to incriminate Cristina Kirchner. Fariña presented himself spontaneously to the court, and told how D’Alessio offered him to take part in the extortion against Etchebest. That charge has been presented to the Justice Department.

The judicial dispatch includes various audios in which, by means of a plan to extort, one can glimpse the possibility of including the businessman Mariano Martínez Rojas, responsible for the fraud against the workers of the newspaper Tiempo Argentino intended to dismantle the outlet, which now functions as a cooperative of journalists. The blackmail involving Martínez Rojas attempted to make him testify against the Peronista governor of the province of Formosa, Gildo Insfran.

The operation to transform another executive into a repentant witness – Gonzalo Brusa Duvat, who worked in a branch of Venezuelan oil company PDVSA in Argentina – has the same characteristics. Duvat was threatened with an economic criminal judicial case, but would guarantee that the process would disappear in the files if he accepted to declare himself “repentant” for Stornelli.

Once softened up with the threat of a legal suit against him, D’Alessio and the journalist for Clarin, Daniel Santoro, published articles about the declaration by Duvat as repentant, which was announced with pomp and circumstance in dozens of audios and Whatsapp messages. The judge said the precise role of Santoro and of other journalists involved still had to be analysed.

What surprised analysts is that D’Alessio managed to join Stornelli’s investigation team, who is a Federal prosecutor, without being a lawyer and without being registered to work at the Prosecution Service. The other assistants of the prosecutor soon delivered a copy of the declaration D’Alessio later sent to another conservative journalist, Eduardo Feinman – a situation which is at the very least unusual and unprecedented.

Another surprise was the transcription made by the magistrate of a phone tap dated February 4th, in which the false lawyer speaks to someone identified as Andrés Goldemberg: “I am at your disposal, if you need to extract someone”. It also mentions he is able to make available an aeroplane with 14 seats to carry out the operation.

“(The evidence) leads me to the conviction that at least within his post at the Prosecution Service, there was a promiscuous situation (of Stornelli), generating relationships of complicity and mutual collaboration which should not have been permitted, with the consent of the prosecutor, including the carrying out of intelligence and psychological operations to achieve the expected results in the judicial investigations or to attend to the magistrate himself”, wrote the judge.

Rubén Armendariz is a Uruguayan journalist and political scientist, associated with the Latin-American Strategic Analysis Centre (CLAE)
Published originally at estrategia.la

Venezuela: US sending planes with guns, ammo and radios for President Maduro’s enemies

The weapons intercepted at Arturo Michelin airport in Venezuela from Miami on February 3, 2019. Photo: Venezuela Ministry of Interior, Justice and Peace.
  • Boeing 767 belonging to US freight company has made dozens of flights between Miami, Colombia and Venezuela since January 11
  • Official said materiel was ‘destined for criminal groups and terrorist actions’ and ‘financed by the fascist extreme right’ and the US government

Venezuelan authorities say a US-owned air freight company delivered a crate of assault weapons earlier this week to the international airport in Valencia to be used in “terrorist actions” against the embattled government of Nicolas Maduro.

An air freight company, 21 Air, based in Greensboro, North Carolina, operates the Boeing 767 aircraft the Venezuelans claim was used in the arms transfer. The flight originated in Miami on Sunday.

The Boeing 767 has made dozens of flights between Miami International Airport and destinations in Colombia and Venezuela since January 11, a flight tracking service shows, often returning to Miami for only a few hours before flying again to South America.

The discovery of the weapons was on Tuesday – two days after the flight landed briefly in Valencia, Venezuela’s third-largest city – as tax authorities and other inspectors conducted a routine inspection of cargo from the flight, according to a statement by the Carabobo state governor’s office.

Bolivarian National Guard General Endes Palencia Ortiz, Venezuela’s vice-minister of citizen security, said authorities found 19 assault weapons, 118 ammunition cartridges, and 90 military-grade radio antennas, among other items.

“This materiel was destined for criminal groups and terrorist actions in the country, financed by the fascist extreme right and the government of the United States,” Palencia Ortiz was quoted as saying.

The freight company, which started five years ago, operates two cargo planes, a Boeing 747 and a Boeing 767, according to the 21 Air website. The Boeing 767, a 32-year-old aircraft once flown by the now-defunct Brazilian carrier Varig, carries the registration N-881-YV and is the aircraft that landed in Valencia on Sunday.

The company did not immediately respond to a request for comment sent through its website. The mobile phone of the company’s chief executive, Michael Mendez, had a recording on Thursday afternoon that said it could not accept calls.

An Ottawa, Canada-based analyst of unusual ship and plane movements, Steffan Watkins, drew attention to the frequent flights of the 21 Air cargo plane in a series of tweets on Thursday.

“All year, they were flying between Philadelphia and Miami and all over the place, but all continental US,” Watkins said in a telephone interview. “Then all of a sudden in January, things changed.”

That is when the cargo plane began flying daily to destinations in Colombia and Venezuela and sometimes several times a day, Watkins said. The plane has made nearly 40 round-trip flights from Miami International Airport to Caracas and Valencia in Venezuela, and Bogota and Medellin in Colombia since January 11.

The most recent tracking of the aircraft showed it arrived from Medellin into Miami airport after midnight on Thursday.

The air cargo company’s website says the Boeing 767 has a payload capacity of 42 tons.

The aircraft in question has passed through many hands since Varig took delivery of it in 1987. In 2004, it was passed to GE Capital Aviation Services, a leasing company that is part of the General Electric conglomerate, according to an operator history on the planespotters.net website. Tampa Cargo, Avianca Cargo and Dynamic Airways later controlled the aircraft until 21 Air received it in 2014.

The provenance of the alleged weaponry was not apparent. And questions about who the arms shipment was destined for, if the Venezuelan version of events is true, only mounted. Delivery at a commercial airport would indicate somebody with authority there would have had a hand.

The weapons intercepted at Arturo Michelin airport in Venezuela from Miami on February 3, 2019. Photo: Venezuela Ministry of Interior, Justice and Peace.
The weapons intercepted at Arturo Michelin airport in Venezuela from Miami on February 3, 2019. Photo: Venezuela Ministry of Interior, Justice and Peace.

Venezuelan authorities displayed the weaponry they said was delivered by the 21 Air cargo plane on open-air tables draped in red cloth. Some of the rifles included stands for long-range targeting. The shipment included 15 AR-15 assault weapons, a Micro Draco semi-automatic pistol with a jumbo magazine, a Colt 7.62 rifle and two telescopic sights, the governor’s statement said.

The weapons intercepted at Arturo Michelin airport in Venezuela from Miami on February 3, 2019. Photo: Venezuela Ministry of Interior, Justice and Peace.
The weapons intercepted at Arturo Michelin airport in Venezuela from Miami on February 3, 2019. Photo: Venezuela Ministry of Interior, Justice and Peace.

Valencia was a former manufacturing and economic hub before the collapse of the nation’s economy.

Flight records from the tracking site flightradar24.com, monitored by Watkins, indicate the 21 Air cargo plane flew at least four times to Valencia from Miami and another four times to Caracas from Miami since January 11. In many cases, the flights would head on to Bogota or Medellin before returning to Miami.

If a US entity was trying to provide arms to a Venezuelan resistance movement, it would be taking a familiar page from the history books.

The CIA operated a dummy airline, known as Air America, from the early 1950s until the mid 1970s for air operations in Southeast Asia, including airdropping weapons to friendly forces.

More than a decade later, Sandinista soldiers shot down a cargo plane taking weapons to the US-backed Contra rebels fighting the Nicaraguan government. A US Marine veteran, Eugene Hasenfus, survived the 1986 crash and told reporters he was working for the CIA, paving the way for his release and return to the United States.

Curiously, one of the figures in the Ronald Reagan administration instrumental in delivering support to the contras, former assistant secretary of state Elliott Abrams, was named by President Donald Trump late last month as his special envoy overseeing policy towards Venezuela.

This article appeared in the South China Morning Post print edition as: Plane from Miami brought arms for ‘terrorist action’

Brazilian government sees Catholic Church as potential opposition

Heleno-BolsonaroLeft: Augusto Heleno, and right: President Bolsonaro

Estado de São Paulo Tânia Monteiro

The Planalto Palace wants to contain what it considers the advance of the Catholic Church in the leadership of the opposition to the Jair Bolsonaro government in the vacuum of the defeat and loss of space of the left-wing political parties. In the evaluation of the President’s team, the Catholic Church is a traditional ally of the PT (Worker’s Party) and is being articulated to influence debates previously carried out by the party in the interior of the country and in the urban peripheries. The alert to the government came from reports from the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) and from the military high command. The reports tell of recent meetings of Brazilian cardinals with Pope Francisco in the Vatican to discuss the holding of the Synod on the Amazon, to be held in Rome in October, bringing together bishops from all the continents.

During the 23 day event, the Vatican will discuss the situation of the Amazon and cover topics considered by the Brazilian government as an “agenda of the left”. The debate will deal with the situation of indigenous peoples, climate change caused by deforestation and quilombolas (lands for ex-slave communities). “We are concerned and want to neutralize this”, said the chief minister of the Office for Institutional Security (GSI), Augusto Heleno, who is leading the counter-offensive.

On the basis of documents circulating in the Planalto, GSI officers have evaluated that sectors of the Catholic Church allied to social movements and parties of the left, members of the so-called “progressive clergy”, intend to take advantage of the Synod to criticise the Bolsonaro government and to have an international impact. “We think this is interference in the internal affairs of Brazil”, said Heleno. ABIN offices in Manaus, Belém, Maraba, in the south-east of Pará (the epicentre of land conflicts), and Boa Vista (which monitor the presence of foreigners in indigenous Yanomami lands and Raposa Serra do Sol) are being mobilized to accompany preparatory meetings for the Synod in parishes and dioceses. The GSI also obtained information from the Military Command in Amazonas, based in Manaus, and from the Northern Military Command in Belém. On the basis of intelligence reports, the Federal government will seek out state governors, mayors and even ecclesiastical authorities who have good relations with the military, especially in border regions, to strengthen their attempt to neutralize the Synod.

The Estado de São Paulo newspaper found that the GSI plans to involve the Itamaraty Foreign Office to monitor discussions abroad, and the Ministry of the Environment to detect any participation of NGOs and environmentalists. Asking to remain anonymous, another military officer from the Bolsonaro team said that the Synod is against “all” policies of the government for the Amazon; which seeks to defend the “sovereignty” of the region. “The meeting will serve to inflame the ideological discourse of the left”, he said.

As soon as the first reports from ABIN arrived at the Planalto Palace, the generals soon made a connection with the criticisms of the National Bishops Conference of Brazil (CNBB) towards Bolsonaro during the electoral campaign. Bodies linked to the CNBB, such as the Missionary Indigenous Council (CIMI) and the Pastoral Lands Commission (CPT), were not kind in their attacks, and continued after the election and swearing in of Bolsonaro to the Presidency. All of them are historical allies of the PT Worker’s Party. The Prisoner’s Pastoral, for example, issued a press release last week criticising the anti-crime package of the Minister of Justice, Sérgio Moro, who as a judge sentenced ex-President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva in Lava Jato.

In the campaign, the Land Pastoral published a report from Bishop André de Witte of Bahia that indicated Bolsonaro as a “real danger”. The networks supporting Bolsonaro counter-attacked spreading word on the internet that Pope Francisco was a “communist”. As a result, Bolsonaro gave up on the CNBB and invested incessant support for the evangelical churches. At first, he wanted the ex-Senator and gospel singer Magno Malta (PR-ES) to run as his Vice-President. Once elected, he nominated the pastor Damares Alves, assistant to Malta for the Ministry of Women, Family and Human Rights.

History. The tense relationship between the military and the Catholic Church began back in 1964 and has remained even in the “de-tension” governments of Generals Ernesto Geisel and João Figueiredo, the last President of the military dictatorship. The CNBB maintained friendly relations with the democratic governments, but was classified as an arm of the PT Worker’s Party by Fernando Henrique Cardoso. The body criticised the agrarian policy of the FHC government and the decision of his PSDB party to end religious education in public schools.

The government of ex-President Lula, who was close to Don Claudio Hummes, ex-Cardinal of São Paulo, was surprised in 2005 by the hunger strike of the Bishop of Barra in Bahia, Don Luiz Cappio, who opposed the transposition of the São Francisco River.

With the arrival of Dilma Rousseff, the relationship between the CNBB and the PT Worker’s Party was damaged. The body held a series of events to criticise the President, especially on questions such as abortion and agrarian reform. However, the CNBB was opposed to the impeachment process, alleging that it “weakened” the institutions.

‘Let’s get right into this’, said Heleno

The Minister of the Office for Institutional Security (GSI), Augusto Heleno Ribeiro, said there was a “concern” in the Planalto about the meetings and preparatory meetings of the Synod on the Amazon, which were held in the Brazilian States. ”There has been influence from the Catholic Church and NGOs on the forest”, he said.

The closest adviser of President Jair Bolsonaro, Heleno criticised the activity of the Catholic Church, but said their capacity for causing problems for the government was not high. ”It will not be a problem. The work of the government of neutralizing impacts of the meeting will only strengthen Brazilian sovereignty and impede that foreign interests are able to prevail in the Amazon”, he said. “The question will be studied carefully by the GSI. Let’s get right into this.”

Both the Minister Augusto Heleno and the ex-commander of the Army, Eduardo Villas Boas, now assistant to the GSI and in charge of the monitoring of the Synod, were military commanders in Manaus. The Vice-President Hamilton Mourão also worked in the region, leading the 2nd Jungle Infantry Brigade in São Gabriel da Cachoeira.

What is the Synod? It is the global meeting of Vatican bishops to discuss the situation of indigenous tribes, riverside populations and other peoples of the Amazon, the development policies of governments of the region, climate change and land conflicts.

Participants 250 bishops.

Synod Calendar

19 January 2019: symbolic opening with the visit of Pope Francisco to Puerto Maldonado in the Peruvian jungle;

7 to 9 March: preparatory seminar in the Arch-Diocese of Manaus;

6 to 29 October: final phase in the Vatican, with Mass in the Basilica of Saint Peter celebrated by Pope Francisco.

Theme of the meeting

Amazon: new paths for the Catholic Church and for a whole ecology.

The three directives of the event

“To see” the clamour of the Amazonian peoples;

“To discern” the Gospel in the forest. The cries of the indigenous peoples is like the cries of the people of God in Egypt;

“To act” in the defence of a Church with an “Amazonian face”

From the Barracks to the Courtroom: US ‘Lawfare’ in Action

bolsonaro

Wayne Madsen | 18.01.2019

Somewhere along the line in recent history, some US think tank in the employ of the Central Intelligence Agency must have come up with the idea that overthrowing governments in Latin America by military coups came with bad optics for the coup plotters. Often, democratically-elected Latin American leaders were demonized by a cabal of military officers who left their barracks and laid siege to the presidential palaces. After taking control of the national radio stations, these generals would announce they had seized control of the government to “protect” the people from “communism” or some other concocted bogeyman.

Beginning in the early 2000s, another plan was devised by US national security planners ensconced in their faux academia “think tanks.” Their plan was simple: overthrow anti-American elected leaders in Latin America through the courts. In effect, lawyers and judges, not generals, caudillos, or military juntas, would carry out coups by abusing constitutional provisions and laws as a clever ruse.

Under Allen Dulles and Richard Helms, the Central Intelligence Agency relied on the old tried and true method of promoting coups via the façade of a “popular” rebellion. After the 1973 CIA-directed coup in Chile, which saw Socialist president Salvador Allende die in a hail of bullets fired from aircraft and tanks at the La Moneda presidential palace, the CIA began to look at other avenues to overthrow presidents in the Western Hemisphere.

For decades, CIA-influenced media, including the dubious Wikipedia, have insisted Allende committed suicide with an AK-47 assault rifle presented to him by Cuban leader Fidel Castro. However, nature would later provide the evidence that Allende was assassinated. The proof came in a 300-page top secret report found in the debris of the house of a former military officer. The house had been destroyed in the 2011 Chilean earthquake. The story of Allende’s “suicide” was spread around CIA-friendly media to mask the agency’s role in yet another assassination of a foreign leader. The CIA’s media manipulation was honed during its pre-eminent role in covering up the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy, Senator Robert F. Kennedy, and Dr. Martin Luther King. For the CIA, however, assassinations were costly in terms of the agency’s public image, so some other method of dispatching targeted leaders was in order.

A formerly CONFIDENTIAL CIA “Intelligence Memorandum,” dated December 29, 1975, concluded that Latin America had to be weaned away from “Third Worldism.” The conclusion was based on the votes of certain Latin American countries that had voted in favor of a United Nations General Assembly resolution equating Zionism with racism. The countries were Brazil, Cuba, Grenada, Guyana, and Mexico. Eleven other countries in the Western Hemisphere abstained.

As the bloody coups in Chile, the Dominican Republic, and other countries showed, there had to be a simpler and less lethal way for the US to bring about undemocratic changes in governments in the hemisphere.

If the CIA were able to infiltrate a nation’s judiciary and law enforcement structures — the latter having already been thoroughly subsumed through CIA-financed “training programs” – it could bring spurious charges against targeted heads of state. This form of coup d’état would become known as “lawfare.”

The leader of the French left, Jean Luc Melenchon, recently condemned the use of lawfare against former Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. Lula, as he is popularly known, has been imprisoned since April 2018 on trumped up charges of corruption. Melenchon told the Brazilian press that “lawfare is now used in all countries to get rid of progressive leaders. This is what they did with Lula.” Melenchon added, “the judge [Sergio Moro] who condemned Lula is now a minister [minister of justice and public security] of Jair Bolsonaro, the new president of Brazil.” Lula was sentenced to 12 years in prison on politically-motivated money-laundering charges ginned up by Moro and other neo-fascists in the Brazilian judiciary. Bolsonaro, a champion of Brazil’s former military dictatorship and an admirer of Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, and Donald Trump, has vowed to keep Lula in prison. Lula would have defeated Bolsonaro for the presidency had he been released from prison and allowed to run for political office. However, Moro and his fellow lawfare practitioners ensured that appeals to the Brazilian Supreme Court for Lula’s release were all dead-on-arrival.

Melenchon also stated “Lula has been a direct victim of accusations to destroy his work and image, built in more than 40 years of public life.” British human rights attorney Geoffrey Robertson QC echoed Melenchon in comments made to the “New Internationalist” in January 2018. Robertson cited the “extraordinarily aggressive measures” taken to imprison Lula and prevent him from running for president. Robertson cited as Lula’s enemies the judiciary, media, and “the great sinews of wealth and power in Brazil.”

Lawfare coups have been embraced by both Republican and Democratic administrations over almost two decades. The first example of a coup by semi-constitutional fiat was the February 28, 2004 forced removal from office of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. US Marines and American mercenaries escorted Aristide and his party from the presidential palace to a white plane with no other markings except for an American flag on the tail. The United States claimed Aristide voluntarily resigned his office, something that Aristide and his advisers vehemently denied. Aristide was literally tossed off the plane, along with his wife, in Bangui, Central African Republic. Through the abuse of “national emergency” provisions, the United States installed Haiti’s Supreme Court Chief Justice, Boniface Alexandre, in the presidential palace. The coup began after CIA-supported rebels and narcotics-gangs seized control of northern Haiti and marched to the capital of Port-au-Prince with the intention of ousting Aristide.

The second lawfare coup was against Honduras’s president, Manuel Zelaya. Staged on June 28, 2009, the coup was approved in advance by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, as leaked cables from the US embassy in Tegucigalpa attest. Coup leader Roberto Micheletti cited the Honduran Constitution and a decision by the Supreme Court as providing legitimacy for Zelaya being marched from his home in his pajamas to a waiting plane that flew him to Costa Rica. The military junta that replaced Zelaya said that his letter of resignation had been approved by the National Assembly. Zelaya declared the letter to be a forgery.

The third major lawfare coup came in 2012. Paraguay’s democratically-elected president, Fernando Lugo, was ousted in a political impeachment carried out by right-wing forces in the Paraguayan Congress and Senate, with the full support of the US-trained and equipped Paraguayan military. From Washington, Secretary Clinton moved hastily to recognize the right-wing vice president, Federico Franco, and his new right-wing government to replace the center-left government of Lugo. As with Haiti and Honduras, the Paraguayan coup was accomplished with the thin veneer of the constitution.

In 2016, it was Brazil’s turn in the lawfare arena. The impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff of the left-wing Workers’ Party ensured that Michel Temer, her right-wing vice president, assumed the presidency. Without Rousseff in the presidential palace, her predecessor, Lula, became fair game for the right-wing.

Next on the American hit list was Venezuela. On December 6, 2015, the US-backed rightist opposition won control over the National Assembly. The rightists immediately commenced procedures to remove progressive socialist President Nicolas Maduro from power through dubious “constitutional” means. However, the plan faltered in Venezuela. In reaction, Washington applied crippling economic sanctions on the country, something that was to be repeated by the Trump administration against both Venezuela and the democratically-elected government of President Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua.

Pro-democracy forces in Latin America and elsewhere no longer have to worry about sudden troop movements and tanks converging on presidential palaces, but armies of judges and lawyers armed with nothing more than constitutional provisions and criminal codes stretched to the point of incredulity.

The Role the US Played in Reversing Latin America’s ‘Pink Tide’

9/12/07 Salon Blanco: Banco del Sur.A mere ten years ago almost all countries in South and Central America had left or center-left governments in office. Now only a handful remain. How did this happen? The Real News Network speaks to CEPR’s Mark Weisbrot about how Under Secretary of State Thomas Shannon might have described to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo the US effort to do help bring this change about

Story Transcript

SHARMINI PERIES: It’s The Real News Network, I’m Sharmini Peries coming to you from Baltimore. Less than ten years ago, Central and South America’s pink tide was at its highest point. Most of the continent had leftists or center-left governments in power. However, since 2009, more or less, when Honduras’s president Manuel Zelaya was ousted in a right-wing coup, the tide turned. And now, a conservative or center-right tide is firmly in place in the region except for the recent development of López-Obrador in Mexico. How did this undoing off the left tide happen? Of course, opponents of the pink tide say that these governments were elected or forced out of office because of their own policy failures. Another interpretation of all of this is that U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America under President George W. Bush and under President Barack Obama played a key role in reversing tide.

Now, this argument can be found in a letter from Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Thomas Shannon, who managed Latin America policy desk for both presidents. In truth, it is actually a fictional letter about the advice of Shannon, what he might have given Secretary of State Mike Pompeo when he resigned last month. This hypothetical letter was actually written by Mark Weisbrot, our next guest. Mark Weisbrot joins us now from Washington, D.C. to discuss U.S. Latin America policy managed under Latin American pink tide. Mark is the codirector of the Center for Economic Policy and Research and is the author of the book, Failed: What Experts Got Wrong About the Global Economy. Thanks for joining me, Mark.

MARK WEISBROT: Thanks for having me here, Sharmini.

SHARMINI PERIES: All right, Mark. Let’s start off with why you felt you had to pen this letter in order to draw attention to the undoing of the pink tide in Latin America.

MARK WEISBROT: Well, I thought it would be more interesting and readable. Most people are not that interested in the recent history of Latin America. And also, I want to emphasize that everything in there is true except for the fact that he didn’t actually write the letter. But everything he says in there, the facts are all sourced and they’re all public information. And even where it refers to positions that he took within the State Department, those are positions that were documented in the media.

SHARMINI PERIES: All right, Mark. In 2008, almost all of the South and Central American states had prgressive or center left governments in place. And this includes El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile and Brazil. Now only Bolivia, El Salvador and Venezuela and Nicaragua remain, with the last two of these, one could say Nicaragua and Venezuela, in a great deal of trouble and in crisis. So, give us a sense of what happened.

MARK WEISBROT: Well, some of it was due to the recessions that these countries experienced. So, for example in Brazil, they went into recession in 2014 and that’s when the opposition began to gain ground and eventually impeach Dilma, the president, Dilma Rousseff, who they impeached without ever actually accusing her of of a crime. And so, in all of these, countries there were various factors at play. But what I emphasize in this letter in the form of Thomas Shannon taking credit for it, is that the U.S. played a role in in most of these countries where there was a change of government.

Some of it is not well known. Obviously, some of it is. In the 2009 coup in Honduras, Hillary Clinton wrote in her memoirs that she helped ensure that the democratically elected president of Honduras did not come back to office after the coup. But in others, people don’t even know. So, for example, in Argentina the U.S. government under Obama opposed loans to the government and blocked some at the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank. And this was a time when Argentina was having a balance of payments problem. So, that was important. And they did run into some economic trouble. It wasn’t severe, but I think it contributed to a close election result where the right was able to win at the end of 2015.

And also, I should say that in that in the case of Argentina they were severely hurt by a decision of a New York judge to take ninety percent of their creditors hostage and say that the government could not pay them until they paid the vulture funds. And that was very much a political decision. In fact, the judge lifted his injunction as soon as the right-wing President Macri was elected, and said it was because there was a new government that he was lifting the injunction. So, that was a major thing from the United States as well. And you can go through all of the countries. And some of it I’ve already said here on The Real News. There was a U.S. role, and of course we only see the tip of the iceberg.

Lula was interviewed a few months ago and he said, “It took us fifty years before we found out about the U.S. role in the 1964 coup.” And so, he was saying that to answer a question about what the United States was doing in Brazil. But you can see things that they did there as well. In fact, Shannon himself, Thomas Shannon met with the leader of the coup effort, the parliamentary coup in Brazil in 2016, when the leader in the Senate in Brazil of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Aloysio Nunes, came to the U.S. just a day after the vote to impeach Dilma took place in the House and met with Shannon. So, that was a signal to everyone in Brazil that the U.S. was behind this coup.

SHARMINI PERIES: All right, Mark. Now you argue that of course this kind of U.S. policy had a role to play in so many countries. Now, give us some examples, for example, Haiti and Honduras and Brazil, just remind people what the U.S. policy actually did in these countries.

MARK WEISBROT: Well, Haiti is a good example because they kind of did that in broad daylight. They took the president, the elected President, in 2004, flew them out of the country on one of those rendition planes, basically kidnapped him. And they didn’t even care. That was under George W. Bush, but the effort actually began under Clinton in 2000. There was an election there and the Organization of American States observers went there and they produced a report saying that everything was good. And then they changed that and they basically had a technical objection to some of the Senate elections. And they use that, and then the U.S. government under their first Clinton, then Bush, used that as a pretext to cut off almost all international aid to Haiti which was desperately poor.

And then, they by 2004, after four years of destabilization, they were funding opposition groups and they were also telling the President, Aristide, that he wouldn’t get aid restored until he reached an agreement with the opposition. And then at the same time, they were telling the opposition, don’t reach an agreement, don’t make any agreement with him because we’re going to get rid of him. And that’s how they did it. And they overthrew the government. And that was the second time they had overthrown the Haitian government since 1991. And so, that was just one example. Obviously, there was also the Honduran coup-.

SHARMINI PERIES: Before you go there, in Haiti’s case, they had the aid of a few other nations as well, France and Canada.

MARK WEISBROT: That’s right. And they got almost all the countries in the world to cut off their aid to Haiti between 2000 and 2004. And then, in 2011, there was an election in 2010, and in 2011, United States actually use the Organization of American States to overturn the results of the first round of the presidential election. And in that case, they also threatened Haiti to accept the results or they would cut off the post-earthquake aid, which was even more desperately needed. And so, they got to choose who made it into the second round and who became president there as well. And this really devastated Haiti in so many ways. I mean, you only had like a twenty percent turnout in the last presidential election in Haiti because the people have become so disenfranchised as a result primarily of U.S. intervention.

SHARMINI PERIES: Now one could argue having a poor country like Haiti, who was was so dependent on the U.S, the U.S. Can us can flex their muscles and make sure what they want takes place in Haiti. But what about a country like Brazil?

MARK WEISBROT: Well, I think they did. Like I said, I think that signal was important. The show of support for that coup I think helped. There was another show of support when John Kerry went down to Brazil on August 5 of the same year and he held a joint press conference with the acting Foreign Minister, Jose Serra and they said talked about how great their relationship was going to be going forward. And Dilma wasn’t even removed from office yet, she was still- the Senate hadn’t voted yet to remove her from office. So, that was another signal of support. Again, we don’t know what else they did.

Actually, we do know some other things. The Department of Justice was involved in the investigation, the big corruption investigation there. And so, we don’t know what they did, how it is that they managed to get Lula put in jail while the banks, who most of laundered the billions of dollars of corruption, there were no banks or financial institutions implicated in this whole investigation. So, that’s very odd. And of course, most Brazilians think that the Department of Justice intervention in the investigation was probably political and they have good reason to believe that.

SHARMINI PERIES: And Honduras, of course Argentina, Venezuela too, but let’s just dig into the Honduras case because I think that’s also left people’s memory.

MARK WEISBROT: Yes, well in 2009 there was a coup and the president was- in June of 2009, the president was flown out of the country in the middle of night. And he was overthrown, and the first statement that came out of the White House really foretold everything that was going to happen and showed what the real position of the United States was. Because it didn’t even condemn the coup. It just said all parties should work together and try and arrive at a solution. And when a military coup happens in the twenty-first century and you don’t even say anything bad about, and they knew it was coming as well. We found that out later. So clearly, they had time to prepare a statement. And they don’t even say anything’s wrong.

That was a massive signal to everyone that they supported it. And then, as the coup proceeded and the government needed to establish its legitimacy, the United States was practically alone in supporting the election that legitimated the coup later that year. And as I said, Hillary Clinton wrote in her memoirs that she helped make sure that the elected president didn’t go back, which was what almost all of Latin America wanted. And the U.S. manipulated the Organization of American States to prevent there from being stronger actions on their part to put Zelaya back in office. And in fact, out of that came the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, which the left governments created because of the U.S. manipulation of the OAS, and that includes all of the countries of the hemisphere except the U.S. and Canada.

SHARMINI PERIES: All right Mark, there’s much more to talk about because Latin America is known as a laboratory of the United States, its policies, and I’m sure we are feeling those laboratory experiments and their are reverberations throughout the world. We don’t have time to get into all of that, and we also didn’t talk about the media strategies involved in these kinds of political policy maneuvers on the part of the U.S. and how the media is used in that way or how media complies with it. But we’ll have to leave that for another time. I thank you so much for joining us today, Mark.

MARK WEISBROT: Thank you, Sharmini.

SHARMINI PERIES: And thank you for joining us here on the Real News Network.

© The Real News Network

Lawfare: Justice’s way to neoliberalism

Justice

Published originally by CELAG | 23 Jan 2018 | Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador

The judgement of Lula has been carried out as part of the huge case known as “Lava Jato”, which was the apparently legal cover by which the coup against ex-President Dilma Rousseff was implemented [1]. This judgement is part of a strategy of Lawfare, as the specialists have called it [2], which implies: the undue use of legal mechanisms for political persecution, the use of the law as a weapon to destroy political adversaries by judicial means [3]. The above describes a process of judicialization of politics from the top down, where the judiciary apparatus is raised above the legislature and the executive powers in a dynamic which could lead to a “dictatorship of the judges”, and a complete loss of the balance between the powers [4]. In order to work, this legal warfare requires the articulation with the media and social networks, which operate to manufacture consent either against or in favour of certain personalities, groups or political sectors [5]. The acceptance or elimination and demoralization of the political adversary is carried out especially in the field of public opinion [6].

One objective of Lawfare in the short and medium term is also to obtain the restoration of neoliberalism by judicial means.

The legitimacy given to the process of judicialization of politics derives from the consensus about corruption being the fundamental problem of Latin America [7]. This was manifested by the international financial institutions and US government agencies promoting the structural adjustment and modernization of the State in the 80’s and 90’s [8], but which in recent years has been presented as a problem endemic to progressive governments or so-called “left-wing populists” [9]. International analysts, think tanks and “experts” argue in favour of this vision, which tends to be reproduced by the hegemonic press, feeding a common feeling that, for example, corruption is the cause of poverty [10], above all in those countries under competing democratic, but allegedly authoritarian regimes (as in the cases of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador during the Correa government and Argentina during the Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner government) [11].

The principal thesis of their argument is that these governments, in giving a greater role to the State, in particular in regulation of the economy, in repoliticizing and revaluing the public sector, prioritizing the use of influences and public funds for personal benefit and the use of the powers of the State to avoid any accountability. This is considered as the principal cause of the rise in poverty [12] and of the weakening of democracy to such a point, that according to the “experts”, people are willing to even support a military dictatorship so as to put an end to crime and corruption [13].

This basis of argument and the existence of processes of legal warfare against ex-members of progressive governments demonstrate that there are other interests behind the supposed impartial combating of corruption. One of the short and medium term objectives of Lawfare is also to obtain the restoration of neoliberalism by judicial means. A state of exception is used as a means of supposedly legal mechanisms, as defined by a judicial apparatus which is raised above the other powers, but which in deed lead to the omission of the law in favour of the violent imposition of a new order [14]. This order tries to show itself a legal, “naturally” predisposed to the rendering of accounts and to transparency, which is to say against corrupt practices, following the logic and the “correct” way of doing things of the private sector, in being restricted to and run by businessmen transformed into politicians.

The objective of bringing in the neoliberal order can be seen in greater clarity in those cases where the legal strategy is used for the opposite of what is supposed, that is, when the legal apparatus is raised above the other powers and the legal mechanisms are manipulated to guarantee the status quo, partnering with media to silence certain cases and to avoid the exposure of certain personalities to public opinion. In this way consent is manufactured in favour of these personalities or groups who have been raised as the guardians of neoliberalism.

BRAZIL

Undue use of legal mechanisms and selectivity

The case against Lula shows various judicial adulterations to the rule of Law used for political ends. The weakness of the legal arguments, the inconsistency, has been obvious in this case. There has been distortion in the sentencing and throughout the whole period of instruction and dealings: 1) the presumption of innocence; 2) the impartiality of the judge; 3) the doctrinaire motivations in the legal rulings; 4) the prohibition of non-legal evidence; 5) the principle of equality or citizenship [15]; 6) the publicising of procedural acts; 7) the disallowing of full defence; 8) the requirement of natural jurisdiction. Furthermore, questions are raised such as: a) the abuse of the coercitive arrest; b) preventive imprisonment; c) the use of selective and partial evidence; d) the use of confessions in extreme conditions. To summarize: the 238 page sentence of Judge Sergio Moro, as various jurists have suggested [16], shows how a conviction of “exception” was constructed, which is the mark of a state of exception [17]

By way of example: the principal charge in Lula’s Lava Jato case is linked to the triplex apartment in Guaruja for passive corruption [18]. None of the 73 witnesses testifying in the 23 hearings brought information that corroborated the charge [19]. Lula’s appeal hearing was scheduled for January 24 was brought forward in front of seven cases awaiting processing in relation to Lava Jato. The official bodies argue that it is not necessary to deal with the cases “in chronological order” [20], but the more obvious conclusion is that the objective pf the judgement is to eliminate the possibility of Lula standing in the presidential elections.

Furthermore, there is the favouring of businessmen. Marcelo Odebrecht, the leading executive and magnate implicated and responsible for the Odebrecht corruption, was transferred to house arrest after completing just two years in prison on 19 December 2017 [21]. Another example is the covering up the existence of kickbacks in various projects linked to Odebrecht, in which Admiral Othon Luiz Pinheiro da Silva was sentenced to 43 years imprisonment [22]. These four decades contrast with the fact that the businessmen implicated in the same case were able to reduce their penalties to six years in prison, although the less favoured will be imprisoned for 20 years [23].

Corruption: Brazil’s main problem

The discourse that legitimizes the elimination of the political enemy, Lula, the Worker’s Party etc., is that of corruption. Sergio Moro, the judge running Operation Lava Jato, is portrayed as the hero who can clean up Brazilian politics [24]. However, there is a lack of deep cleaning: “on the ground, we are fighting against organized crime, (if not) with institutionalized crime” [25]. The media emphasize “this decisive action against crime and corruption of the political class is in turn marked as a more global phenomenon of rejection of the establishment and the calling to account of politicians” [26]. Corruption is the truly guilty party, which does not give worth to democracy: “the scenario is so horrible, that some Brazilians ask whether democracy and the elections can offer the possibility of remaking the country again on a good path” [27].

Lawfare as a violent way to neoliberalism

Since his arrival in government via the coup against Dilma Rousseff, Michel Temer has taken measures to substantially reduce social spending and to eliminate worker’s rights to benefit the business sector. A wave of privatizations has been implemented in a wide range of sectors: airports, ports, highways, electrical power and oil companies etc. [28] Among the long term objectives is the privatization of Petrobras, the state oil company which in large measure is the symbol and realization of sovereign policies in terms of economic, technological and defence policies during the Lula government [29].

The measures were accompanied by a restructuring of the laws in favour of the realignment, notably the labour and retirement system reforms hated by workers and celebrated by the business sector, as described in the hegemonic press [30]. The strikes and demonstrations against these neoliberal reforms were countered by the widespread repression of the security forces in the streets of the large cities [31].

ARGENTINA

Undue use of legal mechanisms and selectivity

The judicial persecution against members of the Cristina Kirchner government has been scaled up after the arrival of the Let’s Change policy of Mauricio Macri to the presidency. In recent months, in addition to the case against the ex-President, there have been judgements and preventive imprisonments against the ex-Foreign Minister Hector Timerman and ex-Vice President Armando Boudou.

The fact that those accused did not try to escape seems irrelevant given that the media spectacle is a fundamental part of this new form of warfare.

Abuse of the criteria for preventive arrest is notable as a mechanism to judicialize politics. In the abuse of this resource, various federal judges have ignored international conventions which the country has adhered to in its constitution, which explicitly state that the primary duty is the liberty of those accused during the process. In strictly juridical terms, at the instruction stage, the only reason for using preventive arrest is either the risk of escape or obstruction of the investigation by the accused person. Innocence or guilt comes at a later stage and has to be demonstrated at the court hearing.

There are various symptomatic cases in relation to the first premise. Peñafort and Rua, defence lawyers for the ex-Foreign Minister, Hector Timerman, argued in his appeal that the accused travelled frequently abroad for reasons of his medical treatment for liver cancer, and that he had always returned within the scheduled times as evidence of the lack of basis for his preventive imprisonment.

In the case of ex-Vice President Amado Boudou, the statement from the same expert highlighted that preventive imprisonment should be the exception rather than the rule, and that the accused always had rights. Nevertheless, the fact that those accused did not try to escape seems irrelevant given that the media spectacle is a fundamental part of this new form of warfare. By way of illustration, the government sent the police to the home of the ex-Minister of Planning, Julio De Vido, knowing that he was not at home, but the mass media used this photograph as if he had been arrested.

In relation to the second point, in cases of preventive imprisonment requested for members of the opposition, the judges did not describe the supposed influences, nor how justice might be obstructed. Furthermore, there is evident differential treatment for members of the Kirchner government, as in no case are the same measures taken for members of the current government.

As in the case of Brazil, in Argentina the businessmen involved are taken care of. At no time is business complicity examined, but only that of the government. One of the most scandalous cases is the granting of credit by President Mauricio Macri to his father in 2016, the businessman Franco Macri. The Macri Group acquired the Argentinean Post Office concession in the 1990’s until 2003, when Kirchner took it back into state ownership for lack of payment from March 2000. After 12 years of the Argentine government rejecting all the post-breakdown payment plans for excessive debts, with the arrival of Macri to the Presidency however, the State quickly accepted the receiving of just 1.18 % of the debt [32].

Corruption: the cancer of Kirchnerism

Ever since his taking office, President Macri has taken the opposite position in his administration to that of the Kirchners, with special emphasis on the combating of corruption. This was backed also by the like minded media, to such a point that the leading newspapers, Clarin and La Nación, introducing a specific tag “La corrupción K”. Mauricio Macri declared that now “there is less reporting and more truth”. In regard to the economic adjustment measures, he justified: “He came to the State devastated by corruption” [33], and, “…after a decade of pillage and corruption, we are normalizing the power service” [34]. In constructing the direction this government, every negative result of the application of its neoliberal policies uses the idea that this is the only possible way. A large part of the population has appropriated that idea thanks to the mass media which has imposed their agenda of persecution of the supposed ¨corruptos k¨ in our news every day.

The violent path to neoliberalism

In whitewashing his presidential aspirations, the Cambiemos alliance promised that if he were elected to the Casa Rosada “he would defend the institutions and republicanism”. Nevertheless, his arrival involved precisely the change activating the Judiciary that steamrollered the rule of law, to the point of rolling back basic guarantees in legitimate process and penalizing the political world, a state of exception. The Milagro Sala case is one of the most outstanding examples of this.

But the “exceptionality” has been there from the start. The economic measures affecting a large part of the population, some imposed by decree, were rejected by mass union and civil society protests. Under such pressure, the government put their repressive measures to the test. One important event was the march in support of Santiago Maldonado being found alive [35], where the police actions were newsworthy: 31 people were arrested arbitrarily, spending up to 48 hours in police stations, including tourists, journalists and photographers. But more significant was that during the demonstration against changes to the retirement and pension law in December 2017, demonstrators suffered police brutality, and the use of water cannons, tear gas, rubber bullets, once again being detained at random and having their homes broken into. Here again police were infiltrated among those starting the trouble.

ECUADOR

Undue use of legal mechanisms and selectivity

Judges in Ecuador have conducted a campaign against ex-Vice-President Jorge Glas, who was sentenced to six years in prison, the highest ranking public figure convicted in Latin America in the huge Odebrecht scandal, and against inner circle staff. Curiously, these “legal” suits have not touched the mayor of Quito, Mauricio Rodas, nor indicate investigating Guillermo Lasso, the candidate opposing Alianza País during the presidential elections, whom accusations point towards for receiving bribes from Odebrecht for the Quito metro contract [36], or for being immersed in the Panama Papers scandal –considering that most of the wealth of these politician businessmen is in offshore accounts [37].

It is important to remember that the legal case against ex-Vice-President Glas was begun after a message from the U.S. Justice Department notifying of payment of US$ 33.6 million from Odebrecht to corrupt public servants between 2007 and 2016 [38]. One message coinciding with the electoral campaign underway in December 2016 favoured the interests of the Guillermo Lasso and Andres Paez bid [39]. Both right-wing leaders were mentioned in numerous cables revealed by Wikileaks [40], placing them amongst the most privileged close informants in favour of United States interests [41].

Whilst ex-Vice-President Glas was convicted, those who provided most of the information to the U.S. Justice Department, were the Brazilian businessmen Jose C., Simoes P., Ricardo V. and Mauricio G., one time members of staff at Odebrecht and whose full names have not been published. No injunctions having been served against them, because the Ecuadorean prosecutors signed a cooperation agreement to provide information to gather evidence for investigations, and under article 494 of the Criminal Code, which states that injunctions must be suited to guarantee success of the investigations [42]. One fundamental detail to be taken into account is the expulsion of the Odebrecht company from Ecuador between 2008 and 2010, demanded by ex-President Rafael Correa, who took that decision for not Odebrecht not having complied with the engineering standards of the San Francisco hydroelectric dam, and due to indications of manipulation and corruption in the contracting processes, which the judge of the case did not take into account, and neither was this mentioned in the conventional media, which in due course criticized the expulsion measure of the Brazilian company as authoritarian [43].

Corruption: Correa’s “main problem”

From the beginning of his mandate, President Lenin Moreno initiated a set of actions to disassociate himself from his predecessor and party colleague, Rafael Correa. In an interview with a Spanish daily newspaper, he said he was “horrified, because (…) there had been rampant corruption, principally in the last period of the previous government (…) and apparently the President (Correa) had turned a blind eye on more than one occasion, because he was not thinking of the country, but rather of the next election” [44].

The interesting thing is that in Ecuador, the anti-corruption discourse has been transformed into a process of judicial persecution carried out by Lawfare, supported from the highest levels of the judiciary and with the backing of right-wing parties. The “problem of corruption” in Ecuador has taken on such a proportion for so many people, that it is to be included in the next referendum and plebiscite to be held in a fortnight.

The path to neoliberalism (with Lenin)

The process of judicialization of politics and persecution of members of the previous government has generated fertile ground for the “change”. Since he came to power, Lenin Moreno has put in place a series of neoliberal reforms, overturning Correa’s policies.

Moreno celebrated the visit from the IMF, and later said he would ask for their help, a warning message due to the implications of a change in direction of the country’s economic policy. He is disposed to hand over management of electronic money to a private bank, competing against the income generated by the Ecuador Central Bank in this area. Going against the recommendation by the National Assembly and the Economic Revitalization Law, this allows imports on a massive scale, leading to a significant reduction in the trading surplus in 2017, increasing imports by 21 % and weakening national production. Likewise, in the next plebiscite and referendum, the progressive value-added Law, which impedes land speculation in urban areas, is intended to be reversed [45]. It is no coincidence that in lockstep with this question in the plebiscite, the persecution of “corrupt” members of the previous government is included.

COLOMBIA

Little has been examined and even less published in the mass media about the way in which the Constitutional Court worked against the peace agreement, by making the discussion mechanism via FastTrack unsustainable, which impedes the advance in legislation towards the peace process and which has once again opened up the discussion on the key points of the agreement, placing the peace achieved thus far at risk.

Unlike the previous cases, in Colombia, the strategy of Lawfare is done inversely, using low intensity legal warfare, where the objective is the permanence and concealment, by over exposing certain cases, with the completely rotten from corruption justice system in collusion, impeding perception of the drivers and actors of a system that is now in crisis. The strategy of legal warfare is only of high intensity in the few cases where the left is able to occupy space in the formal political sphere, after combating paramilitary harassment and a merciless hostile media system. Only then are all the alarm bells set off and all the institutional and legal avenues activated to deal with the threat.

Undue use of legal mechanisms and selectivity

The so called judges cartel is an example of the use of justice for the benefit of the right-wing political caste linked to the corrupt and the criminal, which has been ensuring the guaranteeing of the well-being of neoliberalism. But this case is only the tip of the iceberg as there are many loose ends, and through the over exposure of some actors by the media ensures that people do not ask about the links between certain state and regional personalities with the heirs of the family dynasties that currently hold power. Santos, Lleras, Lopez, Gomez, Pastrana, are some of the most recurring names who have known how to handle political, judicial and communication institutions in their own interests.

This key role justice has played has been uncovered whereby certain judges worked in the Supreme Court of Justice in alliance with the Anti-corruption Prosecution Service, postponing and delaying legal processes against politicians linked to the paramilitaries or to cases of corruption, in exchange for spectacular amounts of money. That is not to mention the multiplicity of family businesses which have grown in the shadow of the illegal activity of the judges.

Corruption: the “problem with the left”

Corruption is presented as a disease of the left. This is the case of ex-mayor of Bogotá, Gustavo Petro, who is now a candidate for the Presidency, persecuted and turned out of office by the extreme right-wing prosecutor, Alejandro Ordoñez, whose rulings against the ex-mayor of the Progressive Movement were overturned by the Interamerican Human Rights Commission, allowing him to continue his mandate and by the State Council, which showed evidence three years later of the use of judicial warfare against the mayor.

Access to the Special Justice for Peace is denied to civilians committed to crimes against humanity, or to financiers or backers of the paramilitaries, and the political reform that promised a democratic opening was scuttled, with seats or blocks being denied to the victims in Congress, and the regulation of comprehensive land reform has not even been started, amongst other things [46].

On the other hand, the protection given by the judiciary and the media to certain people is quite clear in the case of Alvaro Uribe, who had more than 186 legal processes against him, including one about his use of the State-DAS intelligence apparatus to intimidate, persecute and spy on the opposition and neighbouring governments, or for the buying of votes in the Senate to enable his re-election in 2006. All the cases in the commission of inquiry remaining intact in the Chamber of Representatives have little possibility of being brought to any judgement due to it being made up of Uribe or ex-Uribe politicians [47].

Lawfare: part of the neoliberal status quo

Odebrecht has been documented to have financed the campaign of President Juan Manuel Santos when he was supported by Uribe in 2010, as well as having supported the campaigns of Santos and his main rival, the Uribe ally, Zuluaga in 2014 [48]. There are also investigations underway into the payment of bribes of at least US$ 31.5 million delivered to highly placed members of the Uribe and Santos governments in return for infra-structure contracts passed in 2006 and 2016 [49]. Nevertheless, not one of these members of the government has been charged, except for one deputy minister and three Senators, who are assisting inquiries and will be given light sentences, closing the Odebrecht mega-scandal with some mid-level leadership figures being convicted, but maintaining the status quo.

The use of the judicial apparatus to safeguard the instituted order of things has played a key role in a process where the responsibilities and miseries of neoliberal policies which has been operating for decades is evident [50], sustaining the same families in power and shielding political dynasties enjoying the benefits of the State despite being seen to have committed serious crimes [51]. The policy of reduction of the role of the State in its socio-economic dimension in favour of the historically marginalized, together with a growth in favour of the private sector is evident, which is well received by the mass media and is not investigated or questioned, considering that the corruption has two parties, those who give and those who receive, i.e. private companies and those associated with the State.

Corruption in the full neoliberal, privatized model, with the State reduced to the extreme, represents 4% of Colombian GDP, about US$ 17 billion a year according to data from the Colombian comptroller office [52]. This scheme depends on the impunity and on the connivance of the judicial system, the media and violence to repress critical voices, such as the 120 civil society movement leaders assassinated in 2017 [53]. This impunity associated with neoliberal policies in relation to the status quo is counselled by the United States, with reports of corruption cases involving “made in USA” companies as in the case of Reficar not being referred to public opinion [54]. The same applies to the Odebrecht case, both in Brazil and Ecuador. To the contrary, highly placed Colombian public servants convicted of corruption have been protected, as in the case of ex-Uribe minister Andres Felipe Arias [55].

[1]http://www.celag.org/lawfare-la-judicializacion-de-la-politica-en-america-latina/

[2]http://lawfareinstitute.com/publications/

[3] https://thelawfareproject.org/lawfare/what-is-lawfare-1/

[4]https://www.cidob.org/content/download/58165/1509781/…/1/…/domingo_85-86.pdf

[5]Herman, Edward and Chomsky, Noam. Manufacturing consent. The political economy of the mass media. New York: Pantheon, 1988

[6]http://www.celag.org/lawfare-la-judicializacion-de-la-politica-en-america-latina/

[7]http://www.celag.org/la-corrupcion-problema-america-latina-2/

[8]https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/international-support-for-justice-reform-latin-america-worthwhile-or-worthless

[9]https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2016/11/economist-explains-12

[10]https://blogs.imf.org/2017/09/21/corruption-in-latin-america-taking-stock/

[11] https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/latin-america%E2%80%99s-authoritarian-drift-threat-populist-left

[12]https://blogs.imf.org/2017/09/21/corruption-in-latin-america-taking-stock/

[13]http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/23/populism-is-coming-for-latin-america-in-2018/

[14]Sotelo Felipe, M. (2018) “Lawfare, this crime call justice”. In Proner, C., Citadino, G., Ricobom, G. and Dornelles, J. Comments on a notorious verdict. The Trial of Lula. CLACSO https://www.clacso.org.ar/libreria-latinoamericana/libro_detalle.php?id_libro=1338&orden=&pageNum_rs_libros=0&totalRows_rs_libros=1256

[15] Equality is the concept of equal civil and political rights if citizens.

[16] Carol Proner et al. (orgs.) Comentarios a uma sentença anunciada: o Processo Lula. Bauru: Canal 6, 2017.

[17]Sotelo Felipe, M. (2018) “Lawfare, this crime call justice”. In Proner, C.; Citadino, G.; Ricobom, G. and Dornelles, J. Comments on a notorious verdict. The trial of Lula. CLACSO.

[18] http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-40589237

[19] https://www.alainet.org/es/articulo/190468

[20] https://www.telesurtv.net/news/Brasil-Caso-de-Lula-pasa-por-delante-de-otras-7-actions-de-Lava-Jato-20180108-0034.html

[21] http://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2017/12/19/marcelo-odebrecht-sale-de-la-carcel-para-cumplir-prision-domiciliaria/

[22]https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/835/brazils-nuclear-power-program-undone-corruption

[23] http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,justica-condena-ex-presidente-da-eletronuclear-a-43-anos-de-prisao,10000066863

[24] https://www.nytimes.com/es/2017/08/30/juez-sergio-moro-java-lato-lula-brasil/?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Findex

[25] http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2014/12/141209_brasil_juez_escandalo_petrobras_perfil_gl

[26] http://www.pulsamerica.co.uk/2016/11/corruption-charges-and-the-decline-of-populism-latin-americas-rejection-of-its-political-class/

[27] http://themercury.com/endless-corruption-is-a-cancer-in-brazil/article_c2c826b7-75c8-526a-8c6a-862c956cb32f.html

[28] https://www.telesurtv.net/telesuragenda/Privatizations-en-Brasil-20170906-0038.html

[29] http://www.celag.org/brasil-and-el-cono-sur-en-la-geopolitica-estadounidense/

[30] http://www.eleconomista.es/economia/noticias/8737826/11/17/Brasil-estrena-una-reforma-laboral-odiada-por-los-sindicatos-and-festejada-por-las-empresas.html

[31] https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2017/04/28/barricadas-protestas-and-huelga-general-contra-las-reformas-impulsadas-por-michel-temer-en-brasil/

[32]http://www.lanoticiaweb.com.ar/noticia/47193/mauricio-es-fue-and-sera-siempre-macri

[33]http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1920318-encontre-un-estado-devastado-por-la-corrupcion-and-otras-frases-destacadas-de-mauricio-macri

[34]https://www.clarin.com/politica/apertura-sesiones-ordinarias-mauricio-macri-dijo-ahora-relato-verdad_0_H1Nd98E5g.html

[35]http://www.celag.org/santiago-maldonado-desdibujando-al-estado-derecho/

[36]https://www.telesurtv.net/telesuragenda/Lasso-and-Rodas-apellidos-del-escandalo-Odebrecht-en-Ecuador-20170316-0034.html

[37]https://www.pagina12.com.ar/27029-lasso-en-jaque-por-los-negocios-en-panama

[38] https://www.nacion.com/el-mundo/politica/corte-constitucional-de-ecuador-acepta-judge/J2G7EIQVU5GSDCZGM443NLBJDE/story/

[39]http://www.vistazo.com/seccion/country-politica-nacional/politica-nacional/paez-analiza-ir-eeuu-por-informacion-de-caso

[40]https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07QUITO768_a.html

[41] http://www.eltelegrafo.com.ec/noticias/politica/2/investigacion-revela-presunto-vinculo-de-paez-con-stanford

[42] http://www.celag.org/la-corrupcion-problema-america-latina-2/

[43] http://www.ecuadorinmediato.com/index.php?module=Noticias&func=news_user_view&id=2818813271

[44] http://www.abc.es/internacional/abci-lenin-moreno-estoy-espeluznado-corrupcion-galopante-government-correa-201712140224_noticia.html

[45] http://www.celag.org/ecuador-regreso-una-economia-tutelada/

[46]http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/fast-track-corte-constitucional-tumba-voto-en-bloque/525563

[47]http://www.elcountry.com.co/colombia/alvaro-uribe-velez-tiene-mas-de-186-procesos-en-la-comision-de-acusacion.html

[48] http://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2017/07/13/fiscalia-de-colombia-asegura-que-odebrecht-asumio-gastos-de-campanas-de-santos-and-zuluaga/ and http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/fiscal-hay-evidencia-certera-del-ingreso-de-dinero-de-odebrecht-a-campana-de-oscar-ivan-zuluaga/544784

[49]http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/investigacion/la-ruta-de-los-sobornos-de-odebrecht-en-colombia-113000

[50] http://www.celag.org/la-crisis-neoliberal-and-la-paz-en-colombia-por-javier-calderon-castillo/

[51] https://www.elespectador.com/elections-2018/noticias/politica/los-candidatos-mal-rodeados-articulo-727973

[52] http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/delitos/precio-de-la-corrupcion-en-colombia-61749

[53] https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/paz/mas-de-120-lideres-comunales-han-sido-asesinados-en-2017-articulo-724083

[54] http://caracol.com.co/programa/2016/01/28/6am_hoy_por_hoy/1453984041_656591.html

[55] http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/investigacion/vinculacion-de-andres-felipe-arias-con-caso-odebrecht-esta-en-manos-de-la-fiscalia-119426

Judicial warfare or Lawfare

By Oscar Laborde * from Pagina12

The constant persecution of ex-President Cristina Kirchner and the attempt to imprison Lula in Brazil are examples of a new tactic in the non-conventional war known as Lawfare.

The laws of our region have been adopted in recent years as the favoured mechanism to defeat popular governments and reviling the people running them, with the objective of replacing them in the government, imprisoning them or at least discrediting them cruelly. In this war there has been undue use of legal instruments for the purposes of political persecution, destruction of public image and disabling a political adversary. It combines apparently legal actions with wide press coverage to pressure the accused and those around them, including family members, in such a way that they are more vulnerable to the accusations without proof.

So what does Lawfare mean? The term describes “a mode of non-conventional war in which the law is used as a means to obtain a military objective” and is used in this sense in Unrestricted Warfare, a book from 1999 on military strategy. In 2001 the concept started to be used in places other than the U.S. armed forces after the publication of an article written by the Air Force General, Charles Dunlap of Duke Law School. The U.S. is one of the leading providers of assistance for the reform of the legal apparatus in Latin America and the U.S. Department of Justice has strengthened their ties with their equivalents in the region in recent years to combat corruption. One of the most important actions was the so-called “Bridges” project, which consisted of training courses for members of the judiciary of Brazil and other countries of the region. The star alumni is Judge Sergio Moro, behind the Lava Jato operation, who convicted Lula to nine years in prison.

This requires an obliging justice system and for the media to work in absolute agreement with the objective of breaking down the will of the people and politicians who take part in the attack, always propelled generously by the media and who then capitalize on the results of defeating, disqualifying and discrediting the usually left-wing representatives who confront the interests of big business

In recent years the judiciary in our countries has been converted into a powerful force where, almost without limits, destabilization and political persecution strategies are deployed, far from the republican principle of balance of powers. It is the only one which does not derive from the will of the people but rather from complex mechanisms of political designations and contests, added to the privileges which the other powers do not have. This allows them to operate politically under the institutional mantle. The one constant argument is corruption. Its base is that the State must be eliminated, appealing to the “good practices” of the private sector of efficiency and transparency, to displace the logic of the public, which is associated with the waste and mismanagement of politicians, to be replaced by apolitical technicians.

The activity of the mass media is more widely recognized and evident. In an outburst of unusual sincerity an editorial writer at Clarin characterized it as “war journalism”.

Politicians denounce corruption, the media echo it, politicians and media demanding swift justice, a mechanism of judicial power that discipline or exclude independent judges, who convict, without evidence and imprison without due process. This is what we are living under in Latin America. This is how Manuel Zelaya was ousted in Honduras, Fernando Lugo in Paraguay, Dilma Rousseff in Brazil and how the Vice-President of Ecuador, Jorge Glass and hundreds of supporters were imprisoned. This is to silence those representatives of the people by persecution and imprisonment who can intercede in their plan to undo the gains of recent years.

* Director Ideal-CTA. Parlasur representative.