Tag Archives: Lawfare

Lula’s lawyers explain why the conviction of the ex-President should be annulled

Zanin and Lula

Lawyer Cristiano Zanin Martins with ex-President Lula

The lawyers Cristiano Zanin Martins and Valeska Teixeira Martins wrote an article published this Monday by the newspaper Folha de S. Paulo:

Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court (STF) will be evaluating the habeas corpus petition we filed on behalf of ex-President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) on the 5th of November 2018 this Tuesday (June 25). If the rule of law is to prevail, Lula will have his liberty restored to him and the proceedings must go back to the beginning, presided over by a natural, independent and impartial judge, which for the ex-President has never been the case up until now.

The Federal Constitution and the legislation do not allow the conducting of proceedings and their conclusion by a judge who has, or apparently has an interest in the outcome.

Any mere doubt over the impartiality of the exemption of the judge is sufficient grounds for their recusal. Besides seeking to protect the fundamental rights of citizens, this aims to protect he image and reliability of the Justice system itself that is an essential element to democracy.

There is no argument as to the fact that in 2016, Judge Moro illegally authorized the intercepting of the main telephone line to our offices for 23 days, and together with prosecutors and police, monitored the conversations we had about the legal strategy for the defence of ex-President Lula. At that time, we discussed a Supreme Court appeal (Originary Civil Action 2.833) that the Federal Prosecutor for Paraná had no legal attribution to take any initiative in the so-called “triplex case”. It should be highlighted that our work was scandalously monitored when Judge Moro and the prosecutors were disputing the Lula case with other jurisdictions.

The most senior Supreme Court Justice, Celso de Mello, recognized the suspected partiality of Moro in 2013 in judging an appeal involving the monitoring of other lawyers authorized by the ex-judge, noting at the time in a losing vote that this fault must be recognized “in anomalous situations where the judge takes on the role of the real investigator” (habeas corpus 95.518).

This is  exactly what has been verified in the proceedings that resulted in the conviction of ex-President Lula, because besides the monitoring of the defence team, there were numerous other similarly uncontested deeds that show judge Moro not to be impartial.

In this vein we can cite: (a) the rulings made even before the criminal indictment (such as the forced deposition with no legal base), which clearly showed the predisposition of the current Minister of Justice to convict Lula; (b) the task force led by Judge Moro to impede fulfilment of the release order issued by a federal appeal judge of the TRF-4 4th Federal Regional Court in July 2018; (c) the official lifting of judicial secrecy of material on the eve last Presidential elections and also (d) the move of judge Moro to the post of Minister of Justice in a government where the impediment of the Lula candidacy in the election was decisive, on the basis of the conviction passed down by the ex-judge – even going against the UN rulings.

Judge Moro argues endlessly that his sentencing has been reviewed by other judges. But besides the fault of partiality contaminating the proceedings, regardless of the evidence of such prejudice, given the gravity in this case, the damage is obvious. In the crusade against Lula, his defence was treated as a mere formality; relevant evidence was excluded and the deeds of the judge in the case created the expectation of conviction in the public mind that was hard to overturn even with the proof of innocence we presented.

The recent reports by the site “The Intercept” have revealed new and shocking elements that prove the history of judicial persecution against Lula (“lawfare”) and will be very important in the future analysis of the process of erosion of democracy in the country.

Regardless of this episode, the facts for grounds of the habeas corpus petition are more than sufficient to nullify the proceedings against Lula and for his immediate release.

Leak shows Car Wash operation ‘Depends on the Americans’

Dallagnol messages

Car Wash Prosecutor Dallagnol and the message to Judge Moro revealing link to the US

247 12 June 2019

Car Wash prosecutor Deltan Dallagnol told Judge Moro that certain details of the operation would “depend on the articulation with the Americans”, in a further set of messages published this Wednesday (June 12) by the site The Intercept.

In the message published by the The Intercept Brasil, Moro complained that the operation could not be “stopped” too long”, to which Dallagnol responded – in a scandalous promiscuos and partisan relationship between the judge and the Prosecutor – saying they had to await the articulation with the Americans.

Read the excerpt of the messages published:

“Moro – 18:44:08 – Is it not too long without an operation?
Deltan – 20:05:32 – Yes, it is. The problem is that the operations are with the same people who are working on the charge against Lula. We decided to postpone everything until that charge is brought, except for the taccla  op because of the risk of leaking, but it depends on the articulation with the Americans
Deltan – 20:05:45 – (What is being done)
Deltan – 20:05:59 – We are scheduled to charge on the 14th
Moro – 20:53:39 – OK”

Odebrecht plea bargain also makes Federal Prosecution Service into a millionaire fund manager

Odebrecht
2 April 2019

By Pedro Canario

The plea bargain agreement Odebrecht signed with the Federal Prosecution Service in December 2016 is quite similar to agreement with Petrobras. Both provide for the setting up of a judicial account under the tutelage of the 13th Federal Court of Curitiba, with the money being at the disposal of the  FPS to do with it as they wish.

Odebrecht agreement with the FPS also allows Car Wash prosecutors to manage the fine paid by the engineering company.

In the Odebrecht case, the company undertook to pay $ 2.9 billion as a fine for their misdeeds, to be divided by the FPS amongst themselves, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Prosecutor-General of Switzerland. The part that is to remain in Brazil is to be under the charge of the Car Wash prosecutors in Curitiba.

According to the agreement, this money is to be for reparation of ” material and non- material damages” caused by the corruption at Odebrecht. According to the explanation given by the FPS in Parana to ConJur, 80% of the money will remain in Brazil, 10% with the USA and 10%, in Switzerland. Thus, the FPS will be responsible for managing R$ 6,8 billion.

Of that amount that is to remain in Brazil, 97.5% is to go to “public bodies, companies and foundations and mixed economy companies” damaged by the deeds of the engineering company. In other words, $ 1.71 billion is to be directed at the discretion of the FPS. The other 2.5% is to go to the Federal purse in compensation for having committed administrative impropriety.

The sharing out of the money is set forth in paragraph 3 of clause 7 of the agreement, according to which the “total amount is to go to the Federal Prosecution Service”. In response to questions from ConJur however, the FPS asserts that “the agreement does not give the resources to the Federal Prosecution Service nor place them under management by the Prosecution Service”. According to the official explanation, the money will be paid to the “victims”, wherever the FPS is responsible the administrative impropriety suit adheres to the FPS agreement.

Although the agreement is public and one of its clauses says that the money will be at the disposal of the FPS, its destination is described in a secret clause of the document, “Appendix 5”. This document was not published by the Prosecution Service and is being dealt with carefully by the 13th Federal Court of Curitiba, which was led by the now Minister of Justice Sergio Moro throughout Operation Car Wash. At least three times, Moro denied requests for access to this appendix under the argument that it could harm investigations underway.

The agreement with Odebrecht is dated December 2016 and is therefore older than the Petrobras one signed in September 2018 and published in January this year. But many of the elements that raise suspicions about the intentions of the Car Wash prosecutors and its anti-corruption crusade were already there — and have not been seen.

In the case of Petrobras, annexes of the agreement were published recently and revealed these intentions: the setting up of a foundation in which the money, $ 650 million, is to be directed at interventions to combat corruption. This fund is to be managed by the operation Car Wash prosecutors in Curitiba. Naturally, it will be sent to friendly bodies. This text was suspended by Justice Alexandre de Moraes of the Federal Supreme Court.

The Odebrecht agreement has been better protected. But we do already know, for example, that the money that is to remain in Brazil will not be sent to a Treasury account, as mandated by Supreme Court jurisprudence. It is to be under the control of members of the self-proclaimed Car Wash task force.

Rendering services
In exchange, they undertake to “manage” together with the Comptroller-General of the Union, with the Attorney-General of the Union and the Accounts Court of the Union so that they do not question the amount of the fine nor accuse the company and their directors of administrative impropriety.

Car Wash prosecutors
In exchange for managing the millionaire fine, Car Wash prosecutors undertake to ‘manage’ so that oversight bodies do not interfere in the agreement
Reproduction/YouTube

In bureaucratic jargon, “manage” means articulating and in some cases making non-official requests. In the case of public agents receiving money to do so in the name of private individuals, it is administrative advocacy, explained one specialist who spoke to ConJur on the condition of not being identified.

The U.S. chapter of the agreement has less to do with power and more to do with business. Amongst the various requirements Odebrecht has undertaken to meet is the nomination of an “external monitor of compliance with the agreement” to submit reports every 120 days.

These reports must be shown to the board of directors of the company and to the head of the FCPA division of the U.S. Department of Justice. The last item of the last annex of the agreement with the DoJ explains that the reports expected by the U.S. government will “probably include proprietary, financial, commercial and secret competition information”.

FCPA is the abbreviation for the U.S. international anti-corruption law. It exists to punish companies abroad that trade on the U.S. stock exchanges or with U.S. companies. But analysts have pointed out that the law has been used as an instrument of expansion of the economic influence of the U.S. government through private companies in other countries.

This analysis is not very popular amongst prosecutors at the DoJ who discredit the argument whenever they can. But the fact is that at the start of operation Car Wash, Odebrecht had 240,000 employees. According to the company, there are now 60,000.

Defence case
The defence for ex-President Lula, made by the lawyer Cristiano Zanin Martins, has been trying to access the documents for the agreement since May 2017, without success. Moro has turned down three requests for access in the space of little more than one year. The first denial was in September 2017, when the then judge said that handing over a copy of the document could harm other investigations underway. On May 24th of the next year, he was more clear: “There is no need for access to the case documents of the plea bargain “. In the third denial, in August 2018, he merely repeated the decision of the previous year.

Lula
Since May 2017, ex-President Lula has tried to obtain access to the case documents of the Odebrecht agreement with the FPS, unsuccessfully
Ricardo Stuckert

In February, Zanin filed a motion with the Supreme Court alleging violation of Binding Ruling 14 of the STF over the denials. The ruling guarantees the defence access to all elements of the inquiry already documented, provided the access does not harm diligences underway — exactly the argument used by Moro.

According to the lawyer, access to the documents could corroborate the defence case that Lula never received any payment for any “service” rendered to Odebrecht, and that the charges made against him have not been repeated in the U.S. They were brought in Brazil to ensure benefits for the Odebrecht family and for ex-executives of the company.

Moro argued that access to the agreement documents is not necessary. But Zanin uses the example of Petrobras: the agreement was signed in September 2018 and was published on January 30th of this year. Only weeks later, details of the setting up of the fund by the FPS were published — and the information was seen to be essential to the process, to the point of a Supreme Court Justice suspending that part until further information becomes available to judge the merits.

There and here
Lula’s defence have spoken of two main reasons for having access to the agreement documents. The first is that, in appendix 5, says the claim, there is information on the destination of the money paid by Odebrecht by way of the fine, and the FPS is arguing that Lula pay a fine in indemnification for the damages caused to the country for his corrupt deeds. But he is charged with receiving an apartment from the construction company. If both he and the company pay fines for the same facts, there would be punishment twice over, argues Zanin, which would harm the ex-President.

Justice Fachin
There was no “flagrant illegality” in Moro’s decisions denying Lula’s defence access to the agreement of Odebrecht with the FPS, says Justice Luiz Edson Fachin
Rosinei Coutinho / SCO STF

Lula also asked to see what there was in the My Web Day system. This concerns a parallel accounts software to control the bribes paid, owed and received, used by the “structured operations sector”, the bribes department, as the newspapers called it. But when the Federal Police obtained access to the system, they reported the lack of integrity of the files, with data deleted or corrupted.

For Lula’s lawyer, the fact of these files being corrupted argue in favour of his client. Odebrecht told different stories in Brazil and in the USA. Here they said hey bribed Lula for him to intercede on behalf of the company at Petrobras. One of these interventions was for the nomination of ex-directors responsible for maintaining the tender fraud scheme functioning.

But to the DoJ, the Odebrecht executives described how the cartel worked that engineering companies set up to defraud Petrobras tenders and over bill for civil construction contracts, but nothing about Lula.

No smoke
At the Supreme Court, Justice Luiz Edson Fachin also denied the request for access. According to him, there was no “flagrant illegality” in Moro’s decisions, and therefore there was no reason to grant the motion. The decision was made on March 15 of this year, and also calls for further information from the self-proclaimed Car Wash task force.

The current head of the 13th Federal Court of Curitiba, Luiz Antonio Bonat, repeated to Fachin the arguments of his predecessor: allowing access to the agreement documents would harm investigations underway. He added that the documents Lula asked to see, “in the main, corresponded to information which had no wider relevance”. “However, there is no obstacle to providing this information”, Bonat concluded in his ruling.

In response, Lula’s defence asked Fachin to reconsider the previous decision and that it would suspend the criminal case against the ex-President in the case of the apartment. “Is it possible to guarantee that the version of facts from Odebrecht in the plea bargain agreement documents is the same as that given in the court cases? Or are there things in the agreement documents approved there not relevant to the petitioner’s defence?”

Click here to read the Odebrecht agreement with the FPS
Click here to read the Odebrecht agreement with the DoJ
Click
here to read the Lula petition to obtain access to the agreement documents
Click
here to read the Justice Fachin ruling on the Lula petition
Click
here to read the judge Luiz Antonio Bonat document to the Supreme Court on the Odebrecht agreement
Click
here to read the request for reconsideration submitted to Justice Fachin

Claim 33.543
Criminal case 5063130-17.2016.4.04.7000, at Federal Justice in Parana

Pedro Canario is chief editor at Consultor Juridico.

In the style of Moro – spying and extortion to persecute Cristina Kirchner

carlos-stornelli-marcelo-dalessio

Carlos Stornelli (left), Marcelo D’Alessio (right)

Argentinean federal judge Alejo Ramos Padilla charged the false lawyer Marcelo D’Alessio as a member of an illegal organisation “dedicated to carrying out intelligence and psychological operations against various persons who were then blackmailed or coerced, until they panicked, finally declaring themselves in a certain way and becoming “repentant witnesses”, the Argentinean version of the “plea bargains” so common in the Brazilian Operation Car Wash (Lava-Jato).

The key point in this case is that the judge considers there to be an accord between the intelligence services and the Justice Department that goes against the democratic system using blackmail, coercion, dossiers, distortion and false lawyers demanding money of people, and furthermore, to set up and run judicial cases.

All this is very similar to the judicial scheme carried out in Brazil by the ex-judge Sergio Moro (now recompensed with the post of Minister of Justice in the government of Jair Bolsonaro), regarding bribes linked to the multinational Odebrecht, which had the aim of imprisoning ex-President Lula da Silva and of impeding him from participating in the elections. In the Argentinean case, they are seeking the imprisonment of ex-President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, to stop her from running against the current President Mauricio Macri seeking re-election in October.

In the 220 pages of his resolution, Judge Ramos Padilla showed there was a close link between the prosecutor Carlos Stornelli (an Argentinean Deltan Dallagnol) and the supposed lawyer D’Alessio, evident from the many messages and audios exchanged over Whatsapp, and by a four hour meeting between them at the Pinamar resort, as well as handwritten messages in notebooks seized during investigations. Due to this, the magistrate requested the Prosecution Service to investigate the prosecutor, and to begin the due process, if considered pertinent.

In this first resolution, the task is to describe the mechanisms of the crime, as to how Stornelli and D’Alessio extorted the businessman Pedro Etchebest, or how they used a hidden camera against the lawyer José Manuel Ubeira, or used the “repentant witness” statement of Leonardo Fariña, or coerced an ex-member of staff of the Venezuelan state company PDVSA to declare himself repentant.

Despite Stornelli refusing to hand over his mobile phones to enable the frequency and kind of contacts with D’Alessio to be determined – who is the nephew of the Clerk-General of the government, Carlos Marcelo D’Alessio – a third businessman appeared denouncing D’Alessio for extortion and involving the lawyer Rodrigo Gonzalez and the judicial operator of the newspaper Clarín, Daniel Santoro, although they have denied the charge.

The meeting place of the four, Stornelli, D’Alessio, Gonzalez and Santoro, was the restaurant El Obrero, decorated with photos of President Macri. Its owner is a partner in another business venture, of Charly Liñani – denounced by the ex-presidential secretary Pablo Barreiro, of the Cristina Kirchner government, for attempted extortion, committed together with D’Alessio and Gonzalez, as revealed by the journalist Horacio Verbitsky on his site Cohete a la Luna.

The messages and audios also show attempts to use Leonardo Fariña, forcing him to make the declarations required to incriminate Cristina Kirchner. Fariña presented himself spontaneously to the court, and told how D’Alessio offered him to take part in the extortion against Etchebest. That charge has been presented to the Justice Department.

The judicial dispatch includes various audios in which, by means of a plan to extort, one can glimpse the possibility of including the businessman Mariano Martínez Rojas, responsible for the fraud against the workers of the newspaper Tiempo Argentino intended to dismantle the outlet, which now functions as a cooperative of journalists. The blackmail involving Martínez Rojas attempted to make him testify against the Peronista governor of the province of Formosa, Gildo Insfran.

The operation to transform another executive into a repentant witness – Gonzalo Brusa Duvat, who worked in a branch of Venezuelan oil company PDVSA in Argentina – has the same characteristics. Duvat was threatened with an economic criminal judicial case, but would guarantee that the process would disappear in the files if he accepted to declare himself “repentant” for Stornelli.

Once softened up with the threat of a legal suit against him, D’Alessio and the journalist for Clarin, Daniel Santoro, published articles about the declaration by Duvat as repentant, which was announced with pomp and circumstance in dozens of audios and Whatsapp messages. The judge said the precise role of Santoro and of other journalists involved still had to be analysed.

What surprised analysts is that D’Alessio managed to join Stornelli’s investigation team, who is a Federal prosecutor, without being a lawyer and without being registered to work at the Prosecution Service. The other assistants of the prosecutor soon delivered a copy of the declaration D’Alessio later sent to another conservative journalist, Eduardo Feinman – a situation which is at the very least unusual and unprecedented.

Another surprise was the transcription made by the magistrate of a phone tap dated February 4th, in which the false lawyer speaks to someone identified as Andrés Goldemberg: “I am at your disposal, if you need to extract someone”. It also mentions he is able to make available an aeroplane with 14 seats to carry out the operation.

“(The evidence) leads me to the conviction that at least within his post at the Prosecution Service, there was a promiscuous situation (of Stornelli), generating relationships of complicity and mutual collaboration which should not have been permitted, with the consent of the prosecutor, including the carrying out of intelligence and psychological operations to achieve the expected results in the judicial investigations or to attend to the magistrate himself”, wrote the judge.

Rubén Armendariz is a Uruguayan journalist and political scientist, associated with the Latin-American Strategic Analysis Centre (CLAE)
Published originally at estrategia.la

From the Barracks to the Courtroom: US ‘Lawfare’ in Action

bolsonaro

Wayne Madsen | 18.01.2019

Somewhere along the line in recent history, some US think tank in the employ of the Central Intelligence Agency must have come up with the idea that overthrowing governments in Latin America by military coups came with bad optics for the coup plotters. Often, democratically-elected Latin American leaders were demonized by a cabal of military officers who left their barracks and laid siege to the presidential palaces. After taking control of the national radio stations, these generals would announce they had seized control of the government to “protect” the people from “communism” or some other concocted bogeyman.

Beginning in the early 2000s, another plan was devised by US national security planners ensconced in their faux academia “think tanks.” Their plan was simple: overthrow anti-American elected leaders in Latin America through the courts. In effect, lawyers and judges, not generals, caudillos, or military juntas, would carry out coups by abusing constitutional provisions and laws as a clever ruse.

Under Allen Dulles and Richard Helms, the Central Intelligence Agency relied on the old tried and true method of promoting coups via the façade of a “popular” rebellion. After the 1973 CIA-directed coup in Chile, which saw Socialist president Salvador Allende die in a hail of bullets fired from aircraft and tanks at the La Moneda presidential palace, the CIA began to look at other avenues to overthrow presidents in the Western Hemisphere.

For decades, CIA-influenced media, including the dubious Wikipedia, have insisted Allende committed suicide with an AK-47 assault rifle presented to him by Cuban leader Fidel Castro. However, nature would later provide the evidence that Allende was assassinated. The proof came in a 300-page top secret report found in the debris of the house of a former military officer. The house had been destroyed in the 2011 Chilean earthquake. The story of Allende’s “suicide” was spread around CIA-friendly media to mask the agency’s role in yet another assassination of a foreign leader. The CIA’s media manipulation was honed during its pre-eminent role in covering up the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy, Senator Robert F. Kennedy, and Dr. Martin Luther King. For the CIA, however, assassinations were costly in terms of the agency’s public image, so some other method of dispatching targeted leaders was in order.

A formerly CONFIDENTIAL CIA “Intelligence Memorandum,” dated December 29, 1975, concluded that Latin America had to be weaned away from “Third Worldism.” The conclusion was based on the votes of certain Latin American countries that had voted in favor of a United Nations General Assembly resolution equating Zionism with racism. The countries were Brazil, Cuba, Grenada, Guyana, and Mexico. Eleven other countries in the Western Hemisphere abstained.

As the bloody coups in Chile, the Dominican Republic, and other countries showed, there had to be a simpler and less lethal way for the US to bring about undemocratic changes in governments in the hemisphere.

If the CIA were able to infiltrate a nation’s judiciary and law enforcement structures — the latter having already been thoroughly subsumed through CIA-financed “training programs” – it could bring spurious charges against targeted heads of state. This form of coup d’état would become known as “lawfare.”

The leader of the French left, Jean Luc Melenchon, recently condemned the use of lawfare against former Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. Lula, as he is popularly known, has been imprisoned since April 2018 on trumped up charges of corruption. Melenchon told the Brazilian press that “lawfare is now used in all countries to get rid of progressive leaders. This is what they did with Lula.” Melenchon added, “the judge [Sergio Moro] who condemned Lula is now a minister [minister of justice and public security] of Jair Bolsonaro, the new president of Brazil.” Lula was sentenced to 12 years in prison on politically-motivated money-laundering charges ginned up by Moro and other neo-fascists in the Brazilian judiciary. Bolsonaro, a champion of Brazil’s former military dictatorship and an admirer of Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, and Donald Trump, has vowed to keep Lula in prison. Lula would have defeated Bolsonaro for the presidency had he been released from prison and allowed to run for political office. However, Moro and his fellow lawfare practitioners ensured that appeals to the Brazilian Supreme Court for Lula’s release were all dead-on-arrival.

Melenchon also stated “Lula has been a direct victim of accusations to destroy his work and image, built in more than 40 years of public life.” British human rights attorney Geoffrey Robertson QC echoed Melenchon in comments made to the “New Internationalist” in January 2018. Robertson cited the “extraordinarily aggressive measures” taken to imprison Lula and prevent him from running for president. Robertson cited as Lula’s enemies the judiciary, media, and “the great sinews of wealth and power in Brazil.”

Lawfare coups have been embraced by both Republican and Democratic administrations over almost two decades. The first example of a coup by semi-constitutional fiat was the February 28, 2004 forced removal from office of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. US Marines and American mercenaries escorted Aristide and his party from the presidential palace to a white plane with no other markings except for an American flag on the tail. The United States claimed Aristide voluntarily resigned his office, something that Aristide and his advisers vehemently denied. Aristide was literally tossed off the plane, along with his wife, in Bangui, Central African Republic. Through the abuse of “national emergency” provisions, the United States installed Haiti’s Supreme Court Chief Justice, Boniface Alexandre, in the presidential palace. The coup began after CIA-supported rebels and narcotics-gangs seized control of northern Haiti and marched to the capital of Port-au-Prince with the intention of ousting Aristide.

The second lawfare coup was against Honduras’s president, Manuel Zelaya. Staged on June 28, 2009, the coup was approved in advance by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, as leaked cables from the US embassy in Tegucigalpa attest. Coup leader Roberto Micheletti cited the Honduran Constitution and a decision by the Supreme Court as providing legitimacy for Zelaya being marched from his home in his pajamas to a waiting plane that flew him to Costa Rica. The military junta that replaced Zelaya said that his letter of resignation had been approved by the National Assembly. Zelaya declared the letter to be a forgery.

The third major lawfare coup came in 2012. Paraguay’s democratically-elected president, Fernando Lugo, was ousted in a political impeachment carried out by right-wing forces in the Paraguayan Congress and Senate, with the full support of the US-trained and equipped Paraguayan military. From Washington, Secretary Clinton moved hastily to recognize the right-wing vice president, Federico Franco, and his new right-wing government to replace the center-left government of Lugo. As with Haiti and Honduras, the Paraguayan coup was accomplished with the thin veneer of the constitution.

In 2016, it was Brazil’s turn in the lawfare arena. The impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff of the left-wing Workers’ Party ensured that Michel Temer, her right-wing vice president, assumed the presidency. Without Rousseff in the presidential palace, her predecessor, Lula, became fair game for the right-wing.

Next on the American hit list was Venezuela. On December 6, 2015, the US-backed rightist opposition won control over the National Assembly. The rightists immediately commenced procedures to remove progressive socialist President Nicolas Maduro from power through dubious “constitutional” means. However, the plan faltered in Venezuela. In reaction, Washington applied crippling economic sanctions on the country, something that was to be repeated by the Trump administration against both Venezuela and the democratically-elected government of President Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua.

Pro-democracy forces in Latin America and elsewhere no longer have to worry about sudden troop movements and tanks converging on presidential palaces, but armies of judges and lawyers armed with nothing more than constitutional provisions and criminal codes stretched to the point of incredulity.

Lula lawyer says Judge Moro’s acceptance as Justice Minister in Bolsonaro government is ‘lawfare in its essence’

zanin-moro
Cristiano Zanin Martins and Sergio Moro. Photos: Reproduction/Facebook and Agência Brasil

The lawyer Cristiano Zanin Martins who defends ex-President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva said the acceptance of Judge  Sérgio Moro to be Minister of Justice in the Jair Bolsonaro government is “lawfare in its essence”.

In a press release, Zanin said the act proved definitively what Lula’s defence had always denounced. “Lula was processed, condemned and imprisoned without having committed a crime, with the clear objective of impeding him politically. This is lawfare in its essence, as Lula suffered intense political persecution by means of abuse and misuse of the laws and legal proceedings”, he said.

The full text of the press release is below:

PRESS RELEASE FROM PRESIDENT LULA’S DEFENCE

The formalization of the entry of Judge Sérgio Moro into politics and the revelation of conversations held during the presidential election campaign with the President elect’s campaign prove definitively what we always argued in appeals filed in the Brazilian courts and also with the UN Human Rights Committee: Lula was processed, condemned and imprisoned without having committed a crime, with the clear objective of impeding him politically. This is lawfare in its essence, as Lula suffered intense political persecution by means of abuse and misuse of the laws and legal proceedings.

The defence will take all due measures at the national and international levels to argue Lula’s right to a fair, impartial and independent judgement.

Cristiano Zanin Martinse

Lawfare: Justice’s way to neoliberalism

Justice

Published originally by CELAG | 23 Jan 2018 | Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador

The judgement of Lula has been carried out as part of the huge case known as “Lava Jato”, which was the apparently legal cover by which the coup against ex-President Dilma Rousseff was implemented [1]. This judgement is part of a strategy of Lawfare, as the specialists have called it [2], which implies: the undue use of legal mechanisms for political persecution, the use of the law as a weapon to destroy political adversaries by judicial means [3]. The above describes a process of judicialization of politics from the top down, where the judiciary apparatus is raised above the legislature and the executive powers in a dynamic which could lead to a “dictatorship of the judges”, and a complete loss of the balance between the powers [4]. In order to work, this legal warfare requires the articulation with the media and social networks, which operate to manufacture consent either against or in favour of certain personalities, groups or political sectors [5]. The acceptance or elimination and demoralization of the political adversary is carried out especially in the field of public opinion [6].

One objective of Lawfare in the short and medium term is also to obtain the restoration of neoliberalism by judicial means.

The legitimacy given to the process of judicialization of politics derives from the consensus about corruption being the fundamental problem of Latin America [7]. This was manifested by the international financial institutions and US government agencies promoting the structural adjustment and modernization of the State in the 80’s and 90’s [8], but which in recent years has been presented as a problem endemic to progressive governments or so-called “left-wing populists” [9]. International analysts, think tanks and “experts” argue in favour of this vision, which tends to be reproduced by the hegemonic press, feeding a common feeling that, for example, corruption is the cause of poverty [10], above all in those countries under competing democratic, but allegedly authoritarian regimes (as in the cases of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador during the Correa government and Argentina during the Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner government) [11].

The principal thesis of their argument is that these governments, in giving a greater role to the State, in particular in regulation of the economy, in repoliticizing and revaluing the public sector, prioritizing the use of influences and public funds for personal benefit and the use of the powers of the State to avoid any accountability. This is considered as the principal cause of the rise in poverty [12] and of the weakening of democracy to such a point, that according to the “experts”, people are willing to even support a military dictatorship so as to put an end to crime and corruption [13].

This basis of argument and the existence of processes of legal warfare against ex-members of progressive governments demonstrate that there are other interests behind the supposed impartial combating of corruption. One of the short and medium term objectives of Lawfare is also to obtain the restoration of neoliberalism by judicial means. A state of exception is used as a means of supposedly legal mechanisms, as defined by a judicial apparatus which is raised above the other powers, but which in deed lead to the omission of the law in favour of the violent imposition of a new order [14]. This order tries to show itself a legal, “naturally” predisposed to the rendering of accounts and to transparency, which is to say against corrupt practices, following the logic and the “correct” way of doing things of the private sector, in being restricted to and run by businessmen transformed into politicians.

The objective of bringing in the neoliberal order can be seen in greater clarity in those cases where the legal strategy is used for the opposite of what is supposed, that is, when the legal apparatus is raised above the other powers and the legal mechanisms are manipulated to guarantee the status quo, partnering with media to silence certain cases and to avoid the exposure of certain personalities to public opinion. In this way consent is manufactured in favour of these personalities or groups who have been raised as the guardians of neoliberalism.

BRAZIL

Undue use of legal mechanisms and selectivity

The case against Lula shows various judicial adulterations to the rule of Law used for political ends. The weakness of the legal arguments, the inconsistency, has been obvious in this case. There has been distortion in the sentencing and throughout the whole period of instruction and dealings: 1) the presumption of innocence; 2) the impartiality of the judge; 3) the doctrinaire motivations in the legal rulings; 4) the prohibition of non-legal evidence; 5) the principle of equality or citizenship [15]; 6) the publicising of procedural acts; 7) the disallowing of full defence; 8) the requirement of natural jurisdiction. Furthermore, questions are raised such as: a) the abuse of the coercitive arrest; b) preventive imprisonment; c) the use of selective and partial evidence; d) the use of confessions in extreme conditions. To summarize: the 238 page sentence of Judge Sergio Moro, as various jurists have suggested [16], shows how a conviction of “exception” was constructed, which is the mark of a state of exception [17]

By way of example: the principal charge in Lula’s Lava Jato case is linked to the triplex apartment in Guaruja for passive corruption [18]. None of the 73 witnesses testifying in the 23 hearings brought information that corroborated the charge [19]. Lula’s appeal hearing was scheduled for January 24 was brought forward in front of seven cases awaiting processing in relation to Lava Jato. The official bodies argue that it is not necessary to deal with the cases “in chronological order” [20], but the more obvious conclusion is that the objective pf the judgement is to eliminate the possibility of Lula standing in the presidential elections.

Furthermore, there is the favouring of businessmen. Marcelo Odebrecht, the leading executive and magnate implicated and responsible for the Odebrecht corruption, was transferred to house arrest after completing just two years in prison on 19 December 2017 [21]. Another example is the covering up the existence of kickbacks in various projects linked to Odebrecht, in which Admiral Othon Luiz Pinheiro da Silva was sentenced to 43 years imprisonment [22]. These four decades contrast with the fact that the businessmen implicated in the same case were able to reduce their penalties to six years in prison, although the less favoured will be imprisoned for 20 years [23].

Corruption: Brazil’s main problem

The discourse that legitimizes the elimination of the political enemy, Lula, the Worker’s Party etc., is that of corruption. Sergio Moro, the judge running Operation Lava Jato, is portrayed as the hero who can clean up Brazilian politics [24]. However, there is a lack of deep cleaning: “on the ground, we are fighting against organized crime, (if not) with institutionalized crime” [25]. The media emphasize “this decisive action against crime and corruption of the political class is in turn marked as a more global phenomenon of rejection of the establishment and the calling to account of politicians” [26]. Corruption is the truly guilty party, which does not give worth to democracy: “the scenario is so horrible, that some Brazilians ask whether democracy and the elections can offer the possibility of remaking the country again on a good path” [27].

Lawfare as a violent way to neoliberalism

Since his arrival in government via the coup against Dilma Rousseff, Michel Temer has taken measures to substantially reduce social spending and to eliminate worker’s rights to benefit the business sector. A wave of privatizations has been implemented in a wide range of sectors: airports, ports, highways, electrical power and oil companies etc. [28] Among the long term objectives is the privatization of Petrobras, the state oil company which in large measure is the symbol and realization of sovereign policies in terms of economic, technological and defence policies during the Lula government [29].

The measures were accompanied by a restructuring of the laws in favour of the realignment, notably the labour and retirement system reforms hated by workers and celebrated by the business sector, as described in the hegemonic press [30]. The strikes and demonstrations against these neoliberal reforms were countered by the widespread repression of the security forces in the streets of the large cities [31].

ARGENTINA

Undue use of legal mechanisms and selectivity

The judicial persecution against members of the Cristina Kirchner government has been scaled up after the arrival of the Let’s Change policy of Mauricio Macri to the presidency. In recent months, in addition to the case against the ex-President, there have been judgements and preventive imprisonments against the ex-Foreign Minister Hector Timerman and ex-Vice President Armando Boudou.

The fact that those accused did not try to escape seems irrelevant given that the media spectacle is a fundamental part of this new form of warfare.

Abuse of the criteria for preventive arrest is notable as a mechanism to judicialize politics. In the abuse of this resource, various federal judges have ignored international conventions which the country has adhered to in its constitution, which explicitly state that the primary duty is the liberty of those accused during the process. In strictly juridical terms, at the instruction stage, the only reason for using preventive arrest is either the risk of escape or obstruction of the investigation by the accused person. Innocence or guilt comes at a later stage and has to be demonstrated at the court hearing.

There are various symptomatic cases in relation to the first premise. Peñafort and Rua, defence lawyers for the ex-Foreign Minister, Hector Timerman, argued in his appeal that the accused travelled frequently abroad for reasons of his medical treatment for liver cancer, and that he had always returned within the scheduled times as evidence of the lack of basis for his preventive imprisonment.

In the case of ex-Vice President Amado Boudou, the statement from the same expert highlighted that preventive imprisonment should be the exception rather than the rule, and that the accused always had rights. Nevertheless, the fact that those accused did not try to escape seems irrelevant given that the media spectacle is a fundamental part of this new form of warfare. By way of illustration, the government sent the police to the home of the ex-Minister of Planning, Julio De Vido, knowing that he was not at home, but the mass media used this photograph as if he had been arrested.

In relation to the second point, in cases of preventive imprisonment requested for members of the opposition, the judges did not describe the supposed influences, nor how justice might be obstructed. Furthermore, there is evident differential treatment for members of the Kirchner government, as in no case are the same measures taken for members of the current government.

As in the case of Brazil, in Argentina the businessmen involved are taken care of. At no time is business complicity examined, but only that of the government. One of the most scandalous cases is the granting of credit by President Mauricio Macri to his father in 2016, the businessman Franco Macri. The Macri Group acquired the Argentinean Post Office concession in the 1990’s until 2003, when Kirchner took it back into state ownership for lack of payment from March 2000. After 12 years of the Argentine government rejecting all the post-breakdown payment plans for excessive debts, with the arrival of Macri to the Presidency however, the State quickly accepted the receiving of just 1.18 % of the debt [32].

Corruption: the cancer of Kirchnerism

Ever since his taking office, President Macri has taken the opposite position in his administration to that of the Kirchners, with special emphasis on the combating of corruption. This was backed also by the like minded media, to such a point that the leading newspapers, Clarin and La Nación, introducing a specific tag “La corrupción K”. Mauricio Macri declared that now “there is less reporting and more truth”. In regard to the economic adjustment measures, he justified: “He came to the State devastated by corruption” [33], and, “…after a decade of pillage and corruption, we are normalizing the power service” [34]. In constructing the direction this government, every negative result of the application of its neoliberal policies uses the idea that this is the only possible way. A large part of the population has appropriated that idea thanks to the mass media which has imposed their agenda of persecution of the supposed ¨corruptos k¨ in our news every day.

The violent path to neoliberalism

In whitewashing his presidential aspirations, the Cambiemos alliance promised that if he were elected to the Casa Rosada “he would defend the institutions and republicanism”. Nevertheless, his arrival involved precisely the change activating the Judiciary that steamrollered the rule of law, to the point of rolling back basic guarantees in legitimate process and penalizing the political world, a state of exception. The Milagro Sala case is one of the most outstanding examples of this.

But the “exceptionality” has been there from the start. The economic measures affecting a large part of the population, some imposed by decree, were rejected by mass union and civil society protests. Under such pressure, the government put their repressive measures to the test. One important event was the march in support of Santiago Maldonado being found alive [35], where the police actions were newsworthy: 31 people were arrested arbitrarily, spending up to 48 hours in police stations, including tourists, journalists and photographers. But more significant was that during the demonstration against changes to the retirement and pension law in December 2017, demonstrators suffered police brutality, and the use of water cannons, tear gas, rubber bullets, once again being detained at random and having their homes broken into. Here again police were infiltrated among those starting the trouble.

ECUADOR

Undue use of legal mechanisms and selectivity

Judges in Ecuador have conducted a campaign against ex-Vice-President Jorge Glas, who was sentenced to six years in prison, the highest ranking public figure convicted in Latin America in the huge Odebrecht scandal, and against inner circle staff. Curiously, these “legal” suits have not touched the mayor of Quito, Mauricio Rodas, nor indicate investigating Guillermo Lasso, the candidate opposing Alianza País during the presidential elections, whom accusations point towards for receiving bribes from Odebrecht for the Quito metro contract [36], or for being immersed in the Panama Papers scandal –considering that most of the wealth of these politician businessmen is in offshore accounts [37].

It is important to remember that the legal case against ex-Vice-President Glas was begun after a message from the U.S. Justice Department notifying of payment of US$ 33.6 million from Odebrecht to corrupt public servants between 2007 and 2016 [38]. One message coinciding with the electoral campaign underway in December 2016 favoured the interests of the Guillermo Lasso and Andres Paez bid [39]. Both right-wing leaders were mentioned in numerous cables revealed by Wikileaks [40], placing them amongst the most privileged close informants in favour of United States interests [41].

Whilst ex-Vice-President Glas was convicted, those who provided most of the information to the U.S. Justice Department, were the Brazilian businessmen Jose C., Simoes P., Ricardo V. and Mauricio G., one time members of staff at Odebrecht and whose full names have not been published. No injunctions having been served against them, because the Ecuadorean prosecutors signed a cooperation agreement to provide information to gather evidence for investigations, and under article 494 of the Criminal Code, which states that injunctions must be suited to guarantee success of the investigations [42]. One fundamental detail to be taken into account is the expulsion of the Odebrecht company from Ecuador between 2008 and 2010, demanded by ex-President Rafael Correa, who took that decision for not Odebrecht not having complied with the engineering standards of the San Francisco hydroelectric dam, and due to indications of manipulation and corruption in the contracting processes, which the judge of the case did not take into account, and neither was this mentioned in the conventional media, which in due course criticized the expulsion measure of the Brazilian company as authoritarian [43].

Corruption: Correa’s “main problem”

From the beginning of his mandate, President Lenin Moreno initiated a set of actions to disassociate himself from his predecessor and party colleague, Rafael Correa. In an interview with a Spanish daily newspaper, he said he was “horrified, because (…) there had been rampant corruption, principally in the last period of the previous government (…) and apparently the President (Correa) had turned a blind eye on more than one occasion, because he was not thinking of the country, but rather of the next election” [44].

The interesting thing is that in Ecuador, the anti-corruption discourse has been transformed into a process of judicial persecution carried out by Lawfare, supported from the highest levels of the judiciary and with the backing of right-wing parties. The “problem of corruption” in Ecuador has taken on such a proportion for so many people, that it is to be included in the next referendum and plebiscite to be held in a fortnight.

The path to neoliberalism (with Lenin)

The process of judicialization of politics and persecution of members of the previous government has generated fertile ground for the “change”. Since he came to power, Lenin Moreno has put in place a series of neoliberal reforms, overturning Correa’s policies.

Moreno celebrated the visit from the IMF, and later said he would ask for their help, a warning message due to the implications of a change in direction of the country’s economic policy. He is disposed to hand over management of electronic money to a private bank, competing against the income generated by the Ecuador Central Bank in this area. Going against the recommendation by the National Assembly and the Economic Revitalization Law, this allows imports on a massive scale, leading to a significant reduction in the trading surplus in 2017, increasing imports by 21 % and weakening national production. Likewise, in the next plebiscite and referendum, the progressive value-added Law, which impedes land speculation in urban areas, is intended to be reversed [45]. It is no coincidence that in lockstep with this question in the plebiscite, the persecution of “corrupt” members of the previous government is included.

COLOMBIA

Little has been examined and even less published in the mass media about the way in which the Constitutional Court worked against the peace agreement, by making the discussion mechanism via FastTrack unsustainable, which impedes the advance in legislation towards the peace process and which has once again opened up the discussion on the key points of the agreement, placing the peace achieved thus far at risk.

Unlike the previous cases, in Colombia, the strategy of Lawfare is done inversely, using low intensity legal warfare, where the objective is the permanence and concealment, by over exposing certain cases, with the completely rotten from corruption justice system in collusion, impeding perception of the drivers and actors of a system that is now in crisis. The strategy of legal warfare is only of high intensity in the few cases where the left is able to occupy space in the formal political sphere, after combating paramilitary harassment and a merciless hostile media system. Only then are all the alarm bells set off and all the institutional and legal avenues activated to deal with the threat.

Undue use of legal mechanisms and selectivity

The so called judges cartel is an example of the use of justice for the benefit of the right-wing political caste linked to the corrupt and the criminal, which has been ensuring the guaranteeing of the well-being of neoliberalism. But this case is only the tip of the iceberg as there are many loose ends, and through the over exposure of some actors by the media ensures that people do not ask about the links between certain state and regional personalities with the heirs of the family dynasties that currently hold power. Santos, Lleras, Lopez, Gomez, Pastrana, are some of the most recurring names who have known how to handle political, judicial and communication institutions in their own interests.

This key role justice has played has been uncovered whereby certain judges worked in the Supreme Court of Justice in alliance with the Anti-corruption Prosecution Service, postponing and delaying legal processes against politicians linked to the paramilitaries or to cases of corruption, in exchange for spectacular amounts of money. That is not to mention the multiplicity of family businesses which have grown in the shadow of the illegal activity of the judges.

Corruption: the “problem with the left”

Corruption is presented as a disease of the left. This is the case of ex-mayor of Bogotá, Gustavo Petro, who is now a candidate for the Presidency, persecuted and turned out of office by the extreme right-wing prosecutor, Alejandro Ordoñez, whose rulings against the ex-mayor of the Progressive Movement were overturned by the Interamerican Human Rights Commission, allowing him to continue his mandate and by the State Council, which showed evidence three years later of the use of judicial warfare against the mayor.

Access to the Special Justice for Peace is denied to civilians committed to crimes against humanity, or to financiers or backers of the paramilitaries, and the political reform that promised a democratic opening was scuttled, with seats or blocks being denied to the victims in Congress, and the regulation of comprehensive land reform has not even been started, amongst other things [46].

On the other hand, the protection given by the judiciary and the media to certain people is quite clear in the case of Alvaro Uribe, who had more than 186 legal processes against him, including one about his use of the State-DAS intelligence apparatus to intimidate, persecute and spy on the opposition and neighbouring governments, or for the buying of votes in the Senate to enable his re-election in 2006. All the cases in the commission of inquiry remaining intact in the Chamber of Representatives have little possibility of being brought to any judgement due to it being made up of Uribe or ex-Uribe politicians [47].

Lawfare: part of the neoliberal status quo

Odebrecht has been documented to have financed the campaign of President Juan Manuel Santos when he was supported by Uribe in 2010, as well as having supported the campaigns of Santos and his main rival, the Uribe ally, Zuluaga in 2014 [48]. There are also investigations underway into the payment of bribes of at least US$ 31.5 million delivered to highly placed members of the Uribe and Santos governments in return for infra-structure contracts passed in 2006 and 2016 [49]. Nevertheless, not one of these members of the government has been charged, except for one deputy minister and three Senators, who are assisting inquiries and will be given light sentences, closing the Odebrecht mega-scandal with some mid-level leadership figures being convicted, but maintaining the status quo.

The use of the judicial apparatus to safeguard the instituted order of things has played a key role in a process where the responsibilities and miseries of neoliberal policies which has been operating for decades is evident [50], sustaining the same families in power and shielding political dynasties enjoying the benefits of the State despite being seen to have committed serious crimes [51]. The policy of reduction of the role of the State in its socio-economic dimension in favour of the historically marginalized, together with a growth in favour of the private sector is evident, which is well received by the mass media and is not investigated or questioned, considering that the corruption has two parties, those who give and those who receive, i.e. private companies and those associated with the State.

Corruption in the full neoliberal, privatized model, with the State reduced to the extreme, represents 4% of Colombian GDP, about US$ 17 billion a year according to data from the Colombian comptroller office [52]. This scheme depends on the impunity and on the connivance of the judicial system, the media and violence to repress critical voices, such as the 120 civil society movement leaders assassinated in 2017 [53]. This impunity associated with neoliberal policies in relation to the status quo is counselled by the United States, with reports of corruption cases involving “made in USA” companies as in the case of Reficar not being referred to public opinion [54]. The same applies to the Odebrecht case, both in Brazil and Ecuador. To the contrary, highly placed Colombian public servants convicted of corruption have been protected, as in the case of ex-Uribe minister Andres Felipe Arias [55].

[1]http://www.celag.org/lawfare-la-judicializacion-de-la-politica-en-america-latina/

[2]http://lawfareinstitute.com/publications/

[3] https://thelawfareproject.org/lawfare/what-is-lawfare-1/

[4]https://www.cidob.org/content/download/58165/1509781/…/1/…/domingo_85-86.pdf

[5]Herman, Edward and Chomsky, Noam. Manufacturing consent. The political economy of the mass media. New York: Pantheon, 1988

[6]http://www.celag.org/lawfare-la-judicializacion-de-la-politica-en-america-latina/

[7]http://www.celag.org/la-corrupcion-problema-america-latina-2/

[8]https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/international-support-for-justice-reform-latin-america-worthwhile-or-worthless

[9]https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2016/11/economist-explains-12

[10]https://blogs.imf.org/2017/09/21/corruption-in-latin-america-taking-stock/

[11] https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/latin-america%E2%80%99s-authoritarian-drift-threat-populist-left

[12]https://blogs.imf.org/2017/09/21/corruption-in-latin-america-taking-stock/

[13]http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/23/populism-is-coming-for-latin-america-in-2018/

[14]Sotelo Felipe, M. (2018) “Lawfare, this crime call justice”. In Proner, C., Citadino, G., Ricobom, G. and Dornelles, J. Comments on a notorious verdict. The Trial of Lula. CLACSO https://www.clacso.org.ar/libreria-latinoamericana/libro_detalle.php?id_libro=1338&orden=&pageNum_rs_libros=0&totalRows_rs_libros=1256

[15] Equality is the concept of equal civil and political rights if citizens.

[16] Carol Proner et al. (orgs.) Comentarios a uma sentença anunciada: o Processo Lula. Bauru: Canal 6, 2017.

[17]Sotelo Felipe, M. (2018) “Lawfare, this crime call justice”. In Proner, C.; Citadino, G.; Ricobom, G. and Dornelles, J. Comments on a notorious verdict. The trial of Lula. CLACSO.

[18] http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-40589237

[19] https://www.alainet.org/es/articulo/190468

[20] https://www.telesurtv.net/news/Brasil-Caso-de-Lula-pasa-por-delante-de-otras-7-actions-de-Lava-Jato-20180108-0034.html

[21] http://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2017/12/19/marcelo-odebrecht-sale-de-la-carcel-para-cumplir-prision-domiciliaria/

[22]https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/835/brazils-nuclear-power-program-undone-corruption

[23] http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,justica-condena-ex-presidente-da-eletronuclear-a-43-anos-de-prisao,10000066863

[24] https://www.nytimes.com/es/2017/08/30/juez-sergio-moro-java-lato-lula-brasil/?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Findex

[25] http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2014/12/141209_brasil_juez_escandalo_petrobras_perfil_gl

[26] http://www.pulsamerica.co.uk/2016/11/corruption-charges-and-the-decline-of-populism-latin-americas-rejection-of-its-political-class/

[27] http://themercury.com/endless-corruption-is-a-cancer-in-brazil/article_c2c826b7-75c8-526a-8c6a-862c956cb32f.html

[28] https://www.telesurtv.net/telesuragenda/Privatizations-en-Brasil-20170906-0038.html

[29] http://www.celag.org/brasil-and-el-cono-sur-en-la-geopolitica-estadounidense/

[30] http://www.eleconomista.es/economia/noticias/8737826/11/17/Brasil-estrena-una-reforma-laboral-odiada-por-los-sindicatos-and-festejada-por-las-empresas.html

[31] https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2017/04/28/barricadas-protestas-and-huelga-general-contra-las-reformas-impulsadas-por-michel-temer-en-brasil/

[32]http://www.lanoticiaweb.com.ar/noticia/47193/mauricio-es-fue-and-sera-siempre-macri

[33]http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1920318-encontre-un-estado-devastado-por-la-corrupcion-and-otras-frases-destacadas-de-mauricio-macri

[34]https://www.clarin.com/politica/apertura-sesiones-ordinarias-mauricio-macri-dijo-ahora-relato-verdad_0_H1Nd98E5g.html

[35]http://www.celag.org/santiago-maldonado-desdibujando-al-estado-derecho/

[36]https://www.telesurtv.net/telesuragenda/Lasso-and-Rodas-apellidos-del-escandalo-Odebrecht-en-Ecuador-20170316-0034.html

[37]https://www.pagina12.com.ar/27029-lasso-en-jaque-por-los-negocios-en-panama

[38] https://www.nacion.com/el-mundo/politica/corte-constitucional-de-ecuador-acepta-judge/J2G7EIQVU5GSDCZGM443NLBJDE/story/

[39]http://www.vistazo.com/seccion/country-politica-nacional/politica-nacional/paez-analiza-ir-eeuu-por-informacion-de-caso

[40]https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07QUITO768_a.html

[41] http://www.eltelegrafo.com.ec/noticias/politica/2/investigacion-revela-presunto-vinculo-de-paez-con-stanford

[42] http://www.celag.org/la-corrupcion-problema-america-latina-2/

[43] http://www.ecuadorinmediato.com/index.php?module=Noticias&func=news_user_view&id=2818813271

[44] http://www.abc.es/internacional/abci-lenin-moreno-estoy-espeluznado-corrupcion-galopante-government-correa-201712140224_noticia.html

[45] http://www.celag.org/ecuador-regreso-una-economia-tutelada/

[46]http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/fast-track-corte-constitucional-tumba-voto-en-bloque/525563

[47]http://www.elcountry.com.co/colombia/alvaro-uribe-velez-tiene-mas-de-186-procesos-en-la-comision-de-acusacion.html

[48] http://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2017/07/13/fiscalia-de-colombia-asegura-que-odebrecht-asumio-gastos-de-campanas-de-santos-and-zuluaga/ and http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/fiscal-hay-evidencia-certera-del-ingreso-de-dinero-de-odebrecht-a-campana-de-oscar-ivan-zuluaga/544784

[49]http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/investigacion/la-ruta-de-los-sobornos-de-odebrecht-en-colombia-113000

[50] http://www.celag.org/la-crisis-neoliberal-and-la-paz-en-colombia-por-javier-calderon-castillo/

[51] https://www.elespectador.com/elections-2018/noticias/politica/los-candidatos-mal-rodeados-articulo-727973

[52] http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/delitos/precio-de-la-corrupcion-en-colombia-61749

[53] https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/paz/mas-de-120-lideres-comunales-han-sido-asesinados-en-2017-articulo-724083

[54] http://caracol.com.co/programa/2016/01/28/6am_hoy_por_hoy/1453984041_656591.html

[55] http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/investigacion/vinculacion-de-andres-felipe-arias-con-caso-odebrecht-esta-en-manos-de-la-fiscalia-119426